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Article 5

THE NEW TECHNOLOGY AND NATIONAL GOALS
SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR LEGAL-POLICY DECISION MAKING
By Louis H. Mayo*
There appear to be a multiplicity of approaches to the task of enlarging
the scope of operations of the "rule of law," if this standard may be construed
as implemented by any action taken to promote general world community
goals through orderly, non-coercive processes.' To explore certain of these
possibilities, examination is made herein of some of the basic societal trends,
principally technological innovation, which may obstruct or support the attainment of the more fundamental human needs and aspirations.
A.

General Orientation: The New Technology and National Goals
The impact of the major technological developments of the past two decades
on social structure is a matter of common knowledge. Development of nuclear
fission is a classic example of this movement from theoretical science to laboratory experimentation to a new technology which has been .applied for both
productive and destructive purposes. Most technological developments appear
to be merely techniques, devices, or tools in the social process, to be used for
productive or abusive purposes depending upon the designs of the effective
controllers.2 Yet, there is some evidence of an "imperative" component in
the exponential growth of technology, as exemplified in the relentless and rapidly
increasing demands for electrical energy, which is basic to modem industrial
society.' The early development of low-cost atomic power has been advocated
as a primary public policy objective.4

* Dean, Graduate School of Public Law, George Washington University.
1 See POST-WAR THiNING ABOUT THE RULE OF LAw, University of Michigan Law
School (1961).
2 See Introductory Remarks to Where is Science Taking Us? by George B. Kistiakowsky, Saturday Review, December 10, 1960, p. 61; Rabinowitch, Hail and Farewell,
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March, 1961, p. 86; von Neumann, Can We Survive
Technology?, AMERcAN STRATEGY FOR THE NUCLEAR AGE (Hahn and Neff, ed.) 32, 38.

Yet both Rabinowitch and von Neumann seem to suggest that technology is not "neutral"
or "indifferent." The latter states: "Technological evolution is still accelerating. Technologies are always constructive and beneficial, directly or indirectly. Yet their consequences
tend to increase instability . . ." von Neumann, op. cit. supra at 35.
Others have intimated that technology has some compulsive or determined characteristic
which extends beyond human and social control:

Friends of humanity, impressed with the destructive potential of the
new atomic weapons and the brainwashing possibilities of mass communications media in the television age, will thoroughly agree with the following observation of Dewey: "Man, a child in understanding of himself, has
placed in his hands physical tools of incalculable power. He plays with
them like a child, and whether they work harm or good is largely a matter
of accident. The instrumentality becomes a master and works fatally as if
possessed of a will of its own -not because it has a will but because man
has not." Fields, Dewey's "The Public and Its Problems," 9 J. PuB. L. 416,
417 (1960).
3 See Review of the InternationalAtomic Policies and Programs of the United States,
Report to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, (October, 1960) p. 39-45. With respect
to Western Europe the Report states: "Electricity consumption alone rose 120 per cent
during the 1948-58 period, despite the setbacks of the Suez incident and two mild recessions
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The significance of modem technology to American society has been
explicitly and forcefully expressed in the recent Report of the President's Commission on National Goals,5 Wherein it is recommended that the following
national goals be established in the technological area as a basis for building
a stronger nation and a better world:
Technological change should be used to improve men's lives.
We have seen that it brings both progress and problems. Our goal
must be to apply new technology so that it will improve the way
men live and work. Necessary adjustment of 'an accelerating technology must be planned and carried out with human considerations
paramount.
Technological change should be encouraged to meet our own
increasing industrial needs, to stimulate our social and economic
progress, and to face successfully the long-term challenge of international Communism.
Technological knowledge should 'be shared so that people
throughout the world, particularly in the underdeveloped countries, may improve their lives and benefit from up-to-date technology. 6
The importance of technological progress has not been lost on our major
international adversaries. A recent observer states that "technological advance
has been a crucial element in the process by which the Soviets hope to enter
the promised land. If anything, technological advance has been given even
greater weight by Khrushchev than by his predecessors."' Some observers see
technological competition, especially with respect to weapons, as being the
primary element in the cold war struggle.' On the other hand, more hopeful
commentators look to the application of new technologies, especially those
relating to a better understanding of human behavior, human needs, and

in industrial activity. This is about twice the rate of increase in the United States, where
per capita electricity consumption is already three times that in Western Europe." See
also New York Times, March 15, 1961, p. .64, col. 1, concerning the report of a UN Commission: "Increasingly, it is the expanding use of electric power in industry that is helping
to make possible such a very marked elasticity of productive processes as can be seen to
have characterized 1958-60. . . ." A new power network will soon permit trans-national
electrical power interchange among various European nations. Ibid.
4 See Report, supra note 3, at 76-78.
5 GOALS FOR AMERICANS (1960).
6 Id. at 196. In NEF, WAR AND HUMAN PROGRESS 169 (1952), the writer discusses
various meanings of "scientific progress" and roughly distinguishes scientific speculation from
the practical application of scientific theories to specific technical tasks:
Technological improvement as such- the invention of new machines and
new explosives -generally
involves a different kind of thought and different methods from those involved in the disinterested search for truth.
It is possible for one mind to combine the two kinds of inquiry. But there
is also a conflict between them. In one case men are seeking general
truth, which is the property of all the world. In the other they are serving
the particular interest or good of a business, a group, a nation, or they are
serving a particular side of man's varied nature.
7 See Inside the Soviet Economy: The Rise of Technology, Saturday Review, January
21, 1961, pp. 21, 26.
8 See Malik (former President of the UN General Assembly), Will the Future Redeem
The Past, an address at Willamsburg, Va., June 11, 1960, wherein winning the technological
competition in armaments with the USSR is deemed necessary if the Western nations are
to prevail in the "cold war." Reprinted by the Virginia Commission on Constitutional
Government.
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9
aspirations, as a means for achieving a stable and lasting peace.
It is fashionable today to speak of "revolutionary change." And however one might characterize the major social developments of our time, they
all seem related in some significant way to rapid technological change. It has
been truly said that "humanity faces no problem more important than how
to bring about peaceful change, but the importance of the task must not
obscure its complexity." 1
Professor Hurst informs us that the law has always been acted upon by
or has responded to technological change, rather than controlled it." He has
further observed that if invention itself was the key invention of the Nineteenth Century, a basic invention of the Twentieth Century ought to be a
satisfactory effort by the law to make technical change mesh more smoothly
with other societal trends. 2
Professor Julius Stone, in his admirable study, The Province and Function
of Law, restates this problem in these terms:
The point has been repeatedly made, without losing any of its
force, that the contemporary social order must collapse if man's
understanding and control of his human relations do not keep
pace with technological
development, that is, with his control of
3
external nature.'
If we are today experimenting with new ways of thinking, reflecting our
awareness of a new urgency to create social institutions which are responsive
to change, then it is probably safe to surmise that such modified thinking has
been imposed on us by the phenomenal technological advances of the last two
decades. 4 We may agree that our best hope of world peace is through law, 5
yet the "rule of law" is subject to a variety of interpretations even by thoughtful

9 See Toynbee, Education: The Long View, Saturday Review, November 19, 1960,
p. 60, suggesting that the wise use of the technology of the new Industrial Revolution can
provide avenues to a more cooperative world. See also Michael, Proposed Studies on the
Implications of Peaceful Space Activities For Human Affairs, (1961), (Prepared for the
Committee on Long Range Studies of the NASA by the Brookings Institution).
10 See Kissinger, The Next Summit Meeting, Harper's Magazine, December 1960, p. 60.
11 See HURsT, TnE GRowTH OF AMERICAN LAW 9-11 (1950).
12 Ibid.
13

STONE, THa

PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF LAW 479

(1950):

No doubt uneven development has taken its toll of human opportunities
in past ages. The problems which it poses today, however, seem more
critical by reason of three major transformations affecting modern democratic societies. The first is the' extension of the democratic principle
involving active participation by the mass of people in social affairs. The
second is the great and increasing technological progress with increasing
specialization of functions, which renders activities increasingly interdependent. The third is that, owing to this greater interdependence and the
extraordinary progress in means of mass communication like the press and
the radio, it has become impossible io keep crises, whether political, economic,
intellectual, or faculty.within the insulated chamber of a particular
group, class, or humanmoral,
14 Einstein once remarked: "The unleashed power of the atom has changed everything
except our ways of thinking. Thus, we are drifting toward catastrophe beyond hope. We
shall require a substantially new manner of thinking if mankind is to survive." Quoted by
0. L. Sulzberger, New York Times, February 6, 1961, p. 22, col. 4.
15 See Rhyne, An Effective World Court is Essential, 46 A. B. A. J. 749 (1960), and
the paper of the same author in this SYMPosIuM. Mr. Rhyne is a former president of the
ABA who continues to do outstanding work toward the objective of broadening the "rule
of law" throughout the world. See New York Times, June 18, 1961, p. 6, col. 1, re joint
statement of Mr. Rhyne and the general chairman of the San Jose "World Peace through
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observers,' and there are surely many routes of inquiry to pursue in seeking
a structure of orderly and equitable social practices. Some would go so far
as to contend that the only means of avoiding the dangers of uncontrolled
nuclear, chemical, and biological warfare is to adopt some form of world
government.? It would appear, however, that we are at this time far from
finding satisfactory solutions to these perils. The following comments will be
directed not so much to the extension of systems of rules of existing law as
to an examination of certain types of current legal-policy problems and a few
suggestions as to possible modifications of advanced law school training which
will better help us understand such problems.
It might be suggested that the best long-range prospect for the development of the "rule of law" is to encourage and train competent young people
in the analysis of and creative disposition of legal-policy questions. It would,
in fact, seem that this obligation has been inescapably thrust upon us by the
new technology.
B.

Major Forces, Movements, and Trends in the Contemporary World

Whatever contribution the legal profession may make to the analysis and
solution of major contemporary socio-political problems will depend upon the
grasp lawyers in legal-policy roles have of the more influential non-legal forces,
movements, and trends which shape the present world context. It will require
an understanding of the nature and implications of such significant factors as
the following: the spread of industrialism," the rising demands of the preindustrial nations, 9 the growing interdependence of nations," the increasing
role of the state in social and business affairs,"' the drift toward "bigness" in
the Rule of Law" conference: "The consensus of San Jose is a first statement of universal
principles on which a structure of world law can be built. This meeting has been a most
significant milestone in the evolution of civilization."
16 See Jones, World Peace Through Law, 46 A. B. A. J 1300 (1960).
17 See, e.g., CLARK AND SOHN, WORLD PEACE THROUGH WORLD LAW (1958); COUSINS,
IN PLACE OF FOLLY (1960). See also, Prescription for Peace, by Senator Joseph Clark,
Saturday Review, January 21, 1961, p. 63; Emery Reves, Why Waste Time Discussing
Disarmament?, Look, March 28, 1961, insisting that world law is essential for peace;
Actually, Mr. Warburg's ideas differ quite sharply from those of Khrushchev, because Mr. Warburg sees the necessity for a high degree of inspection and control, and would create puissant supra-national agencies to
exercise it. Indeed he cites the Grenville Clark-Louis Sohn plan as his
model, and this would provide for such powerful and such thoroughgoing
control organs that they might more properly be described as world
Government.
Jerome H. Spingarn, Director of the National Planning Association's Arms Control Research
Project, New York Times Book Review Section, May 21, 1961, p. 10, col. 2, reviewing
WARBURG, DISARMAMENT:
18
See KERR, ET AL.,

THE CHOICE OF THE NINETEEN SIXTIES.
INDUSTRIALISM AND INDUSTRIAL MAN (1960),

herinafter cited

as INDUSTRIALISM.

19 See New York Times, January 10, 1961, p. C 49, col. 4, re the "Revolution of
Rising Expectations."
20 See STONE, Op. cit. supra note 13; the theme that the Industrial Revolution and the
economic and commercial dependence resulting therefrom provided the primary motive force
for the high degree of interdependence in the industrialized world community of today is
expressed in EAGLETON, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENT 8 (1948 ed.): "International industrial organization has proceeded with its division of labor until nations as well as individuals
are dependent upon each other."
21 See INDUsTRIALISM 40. See also HEILBRONER, THE FUTURE As HISTORY 112, 186
(1960).
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industrial and labor organizations, 22 the growing importance of the administrative function in governmental operations,23 the movement toward urbanization
and the breakdown of traditional political boundaries," the growing acceptance
of the scientific orientation and the expanding research function,25 the
accelerating rate of information accumulation,2" the drive toward automation, 27
and the increasing alarm registered over our seeming inability to create social
and political institutions capable of harnessing, for human benefit, the afore22 See, e.g., BERLE, ECONOMIC POWER AND THE FREE SOCIETY (1957); BERLE AND
HARBREOHT, TOWARD THE PARAPROPRIETAL SOCIETY (1959); GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM: THE CONCEPT OF COUNTERVAILING POWER (1952); LILIENTHAL, BIG BUSINESS:
A NEW ERA (1952).

23 See FRIEDMANN, LAW IN A CHANGING SOCIETY, Ch. 11- The Growth of Administration and the Evolution of Public Law (1960). See also, MILLER AND HOWELL, THE
MYTH OF NEUTRALITY IN CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION 661, 684-685 (1960).
24 See Symposium. The Future Metropolis, Daedalus, Winter 1961; INDUSTRIALISM 39.
Traditional boundaries and "states' rights" concepts are being strained by the new reach
of a rapidly expanding suburbia and the necessity for a network of public service facilities
to span interstate metropolitan areas. The recent dispute between the New York Port
Authority and the Congress points up some of the emerging problems. See Comment, Congress and the Port of New York Authority, Federal Supervision of Interstate Compacts, 70
YALE L. J. 812 (1961).
The enormous difficulties involved in simply transporting people
within growing urban centers provides a good measure of the range and quality of economic,
social, and legal problems which will challenge the very best professional minds for decades
ahead. See The Research Frontier, Saturday Review, January 7, 1961, p. 86.
25 See comments on the report of the President's Science Advisory Committee, New
York Times, January 9, 1961, p. 81, col. 5: "Research is not only big business in itself,
but a growing big business." The nation spent $3 billion for research and development in
1950. In 1960 it spent $13 billion. An unlikely but quite relevant source of comment on
the growing research function is to be found in the Farewell Address of former President
Eisenhower. See New York Times, January 18, 1961, p. 22, col. 3. On July 9, 1961, a
major policy study of the National Science Foundation recommended the trebling of the
nation's investment in scientific education and research over the next ten years. New York
Times, July 10, 1961, p. 1, col. 1. The vast range, significance, and cost of the research
function in the nuclear energy field is set forth in a talk by Leland J. 'Haworth, Commissioner of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, before the American Nuclear Society, June
6, 1961. See U.S. AEC release of June 7, 1961, No. S-12-61. See also New York Times,
February 26, 1961, p. 1, col. 2, to the effect that while the Soviet Union has scored great
achievements in space technology, it still lags behind the U. S. in "breadth of interest,
originality of concept, and volume of space research." See also Chase, The Longest Way
from Thought to Action, The Reporter, June 22, 1961, p. 28 (reviewing and indicating the sigificance attached to some of the more notable governmental and policy study reports of
recent years); Katzenbach, Ideas: A New Defense Industry, The Reporter, March 2, 1961,,
p. 17.
26 See HEILBRONER, op. cit. supra note 21, at 157. See also Toynbee, Education, The
Long View, Saturday Review, November 19, 1960, p. 60:
How is a limited human mind to cope with a cultural heritage that is perpetually increasing in bulk? The problem is aggravated when people begin
deliberately to extend the range of human knowledge by systematic research
(p. 61).... Research of whatever kind is good for teaching, because it
sets a standard of precision and thoroughness which the researcher will
exact from himself and demand from his pupils. But here, as so often
before, we are brought back to the problems set by the limits of the
capacity of human minds. Even if formal education is to become lifelong,
how can a single mind in a single lifetime acquire an education that will
be exact and at the same time comprehensive? We can not do without
either of these conditions in a world that has become "one world" and
that has also become scientific in its intellectual standards. (p. 79).
See also, on the problem of accelerated pace of change in the world and the appalling mass
of human knowledge about scientific matters and the interactions of technology and society;
report on M. I. T. Parley on Scientific and Engineering education, New York Times,
April 8, 1961, p. C-7, col. 1.
Dr. Chin Ning Yang of the Institute for Advanced Study has cautioned that the growing
accumulation of knowledge and the growing complexity of that body of knowledge would
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mentioned trends, almost all of which spring largely from technological advance."
Industrialism, perhaps, possesses the characteristic of a universal force to
a greater degree than any other trend or movement of the time. Modem
industrial civilization has been described as "the most aggressive form of
civilization mankind has ever known." 29 The combination of intellectual drive,
make it harder to forge ahead to higher levels of understanding. He compares this dilemma
with the increasing difficulty a chess player experiences when his growing mastery of the
game prompts him to calculate his moves farther and farther ahead than he has done in
the past. Dr. Richard Feynman, of Cal. Tech., has suggested that it is still not obvious
that such a pace of discovery can continue indefinitely- through such a time span of
1000 years. New York Times, April 9, 1961, p. 70, col. 2.
27 See HEILBRONER, op. cit. supra note 21, at 159; see also A. H. Raskin, New York
Times, Jan. 15, 1961, p. 47, col. 1, concerning the "revolutionary changes" taking place
in industrial employment which have been created by technological advances in automation
procedures.
28 See STONE, op. cit. supra note 13. See also Salter, Modern Mechanization and its
Effect on the Structure of Society, SCIENCE AND SOCIAL CHANGE 317, 319-20 (1939);
CHASE, THE PROPER STUDY O' MANKIND (1948) Ch. 11, 112-122, Some Laws of Social
Change, including the concept of "exponential growth" or advance on the basis of the
"compound interest curve" and the mechanics of "cultural lag." The series of papers
included by Jesse E. Thornton in SCIENCE AND SOCIAL CHANGE (1939), (The Brookings
Institution) are very useful on the thinking of the interrelationships of science, technology
and social transformation as seen by many prominent scholars during the 1930's. Most of
the significant issues which still persist are treated therein.
Suggestions as to the more important scientific and technological developments of the
next few decades and the type of societal and governmental response that will be required
to meet the challenge are considered in MEIER, SCIENCE AND ECONOMIC DEvELOPMENT,
Ch. IV, New Patterns of Living (1956). See in particular The Developmental Society at
197 and Social Organization for New Technology at 207.
A recent book which covers a wide range of scientific-social relationships is ALLEN, ET AL.,
TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIAL CHANGE (1957).
Basic parts treat: Processes and Theories of
Social Change; The Social Effects of Selected Major Inventions; The Influence of Technology on Social Institutions; Rapid Social Change and Social Problems; and Social Change,
Planning, and Social Control. The Preface states:
Finally, this text maintains a definite point of view toward the subject of
social change: it holds that technology and applied science constitute a
dominant and crucial force in causing change in modern Western society.
This may be regarded as the basic underlying theme of the work.
See also Auerbach, Law and Social Change in the United States, 6 U. C. L. A. L. Rnv. 516
(1959), for a discussion of law as a factor in the social process. The author states: "Since
the advent of the Industrial Revolution we have been struggling . . . with the problem
of determining what combination of public and private ordering of human activities is
necessary to safeguard and enlarge individual freedoms and at the same time enable individuals to enjoy the potential benefits of modern science and technology." Id. at 529; On
law and social change see Dror, Prolegomenon to a Social Study of Law, 13 J. LEGAL ED.
131 (1960):
The power to shape the future course of events so as to extend the benefits
of advancing scientific knowledge for the satisfaction of common human
need may now be ours insofar, and only insofar as our conduct is guided
by an understanding of the impact of science on human society. During
the latter half of the nineteenth century a powerful school of political
thought was led to advance three main conclusions from a study of the
influence which changing technology was then exerting on the social
superstructures of the time. One was that nations were becoming economically more interdependent. A second was that skilled and privileged
workmanship and the standard of life of the employed classes as a whole
would continue to decline. The third was that the militant opposition
of the employed classes to the existing economic system would continue to
increase. On these conclusions they based a social policy which has outlived the impulse to searching examination of current events from the
same standpoint.
HOGBEN, SCIENCE FOR THE CITIZEN 1127-1128 (3rd ed.).
29 See INDUSTRIALISM supra note 18, at 266, quoted from WARD, FIvE IDEAS THAT
CHANGED THE WORLD 87 (1959).
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scientific inquiry, technical evolution and industrial development is said to
have worked a total transformation of all aspects of life - "not only of organization and technique, but of fundamental habits of thought and social behavior. '30
As the authors of a recent treatise on the subject have stated:
Industrialization creates vast urban areas; makes possible a great
explosion of population; yields a new standard of living and of leisure; draws on new skills both social and technical; requires a vast
network of rules to guide and coerce men in the complex and interrelated tasks ssential to its successful growth; spawns new centers
of organized power and furthers the concentration of authority
in old centers, particularly the state; forges new methods of attaining
and retaining this power; links men together in new chains of
subordination and invites new frictions at each of the links in these
chains; and provides a new culture based on mass tastes and mass
consumption which gradually overwhelms the many and varied
pre-existing cultures. It is
31 the great transformation - successful,
all-embracing, irreversible.
Appreciation of the enormous material benefits which accrue to highly
industrialized societies is no longer lacking in the pre-industrial nations of the
world. The spread of popular aspirations for the better life, the so-called
"revolution of rising expectations," is gripping large segments of the underdeveloped peoples who are beginning to demand a minimum share of the
world's desirable goods.3 2 An African editor has commented on this development in these terms:
30 Ibid.

31 INDUSTRIALISm, supra note 18, at 266. Industrialization is basically a unifying,
standardizing process which, however, varies with a number of factors including the type
of "elite group" controlling the process: "dynastic elites with their paternal community,
the middle classes with the market system, the revolutionary intellectual with their centralized
state, the colonial administrators with their service to the home market or the compatriot
settlers or the home ideology, and the nationalist leaders with their state-guided development.. ." The exercise of this dominant authority depends further upon the "nature of
the pre-existing society, the role of geography, the stage of history, and the accidents of
history." In such industrializing process these elite groups are called upon to resolve certain
issues of fundamental importance, if not pre-determined by established custom or by the
imposition of a drastically new ideology, as for example: the degree to which power is
centralized or shared; the role of the state in political and economic decision-making;
whether to shape a "managed" or "market" economy; the emphasis to be placed on group
or individual values; the relative significance of status and contract; the extent of class
stratification; the area of uninhibited inquiry and research; and the role of the educational
process with reference to its potential impact on the distribution of political power. Id. at
Ch. 10, Pluralistic Industrialism.
32 See THEOBALD, THE RICH AND THE POOR: A STUDY OF THE EcONOMICs OF RIsrNG
EXPEcTATIONS 29-37 (1961 Mentor ed.); hILBRONER, op. cit, supra note 21, at 80, 93,
157; Roberts, An Age of Violence: Cuba is Forerunnerof Many Explosions, Washington Post,

April 23, 1961, p. A-20, col. 1, re probable series of revolutionary uprisings. See also Paul
G. Hoffman, The Greatest Challenge of All, Public Affairs Pamphlet No. 313.
An interesting observation re the bi-polar world of nuclear weapons made in letter to
editor of N. Y. Times, Sunday, April 30, 1961, p. E-10, col. 5, by C. Rajagopalachari,
(former Governor General of India from 1940 to 1950), April 22, 1961, saying re the
nuclear powers, U. S. and USSR as of now:
They are not prepared to go out to relieve or help victims against oppressors, if such action carries with it the possibility of a clash with another
power which can start a nuclear war. The biggest powers now are more
anxious to preserve peace and look after their own security than to yield
to the call to do noble deeds. The weaker nations have been completely
orphaned by the atom.
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But casting off the bonds of colonial tutelage does not in itself solve
the problems. Most of the people concerned are in a very real
sense economically and technically less developed. What we mean
by this is that poverty, misery, illiteracy, chronic ill health, are an
integral part of their daily life. Until recently they have endured
these evils in passive despair because they had no vision of anything
better. But today they know that hunger, disease, fruitless toil, and
early death are not inevitable, that itis possible to create conditions
in which they and their children can have a better life. What has
been 33aptly termed "the revolution of rising expectations" is underway.
An integral part of this matrix of industrialism and of rising demands
by the relatively underprivileged nations is the growing factor of interdependence among the nations of the world. As James Reston has recently
remarked:
The more the Kennedy Administration studies its new responsibilities, the more conscious it becomes of the complexity and interconnection of its domestic and foreign problems. It cannot even
think about balancing the budget without the cooperation of the
industrial nations of Western Europe, whose defense policies and
programs for the underdeveloped nations affect the level of expenditure in Washington.... In the international field ... cooperation
through OECD and NATO . . . will affect our decisions on the

budget, on interest rates, and on foreign trade and may well in the
end lead to limitations on our sovereignty. .

.

. The facts of eco-

nomics and finance, politics
and philosophy, are integrating the
34
nations as well as the races.
One of the more conspicuous contradictions of the era arises out of the
fact that the obvious trend toward mutual dependence is accompanied by
intensely emotional, even violent, dutbursts of nationalism. But as Henry A.
Kissinger has said:
The great revolution of our time is the breakdown of the selfsufficient nation-state. Not even the most powerful country is
capable by itself of maintaining security or of realizing the aspirations of its people. One of the ironies of our day is that more and
more nations are coming into being at the precise moment when
the nation-state is becoming incapable of dealing with many of
its problems and the interdependence of states is even more
obvious.3 5

Professor Friedmann has warned of attempting to oversimplify or ignore
the considerable diversity in the internal social organizations of the different
nations, which will continue to complicate the problems of achieving international order and "world peace through world law. '"
Whatever. the source and quality of objections to the scientific orientation,
the spread of technology, and expanding industrialism, whether arising from
reactionary dynastic elites or from democratic liberals resisting the forces of
standardization, this trend will probably persist, at least, for the foreseeable
33
34
35
36

New York Times, January 10, 1961, p. C-49, col. 4.
New York Times, February 10, 1961, p. 26, col. 3.
Kissinger, For An Atlantic Confederacy, The Reporter, February 2, 1961, p. 16.
See FRIEDMANN, op. cit. supra note 23, at 455.

NEW TECHNOLOGY AND NATIONAL GOALS
future. Furthermore, Alfred North Whitehead has pointed out, history .has
disclosed only three ways to escape the Malthusian dilemnma of overpopula-

tion - expanding commerce, improved technology, and utilization of empty
spaces." Obviously, of these three, expanding technology must be given the
prominent role. Many contemporary scholars also view industrialism and
advancing technology as irreversible trends. " Even Professor Heilbroner, who
takes an exceedingly pessimistic view of the future, both with respect to the
prospects for a "better" world and for an improvement in the quality of individual liberty and dignity, nevertheless says: "Whatever its capacity for the
destruction or the diminution of man, the perfection and application of industrial technology is withal the only possible escape from the historic indenture
of man."

9

Professor Harrison Brown, in a recent article, examines the implications
of the elimination of war, and finds that a multiplicity of problems would still
confront us since certain problems have traditionally depended upon warfare,
or at least military power, for their solution.4" Hence, substitute measures for
solving these problems must be found. Noting that we are living in the midst
of an enormous revolution, characterized primarily by rapid technological
change, he sees the process of urbanization creating an increasingly complex
society, not only nationally but internationally, since there is a growing dependence of most nations on resources of other nations. 1 Projecting into the future,
he suggests that as industrialism spreads, competition for essential and scarce
resources may drastically increase.42 He feels that industrialization of the
underdeveloped areas of the world is the most pressing problem facing mankind today, next to the abolition of war, and that the latter is tied in closely
with the improvement of conditions in pre-industrial nations and a hoped-for
reduction of international tensions." He warns that if impressive measures are
not taken by the Western world to alleviate intolerable conditions that the
rapid spread of totalitarianism is most probable, and adds, "With modern
techniques of control and persuasion, this process may become irreversible." 4
In accordance with the basic theme herein examined he concludes:
We know this to be a fact: it is not the lack of technical knowl-

edge or of knowledge of the earth's resources that are the major
barriers to the evolution of a world in which all individuals have
the opportunity of leading free and abundant lives. The primary

hindrance is man's apparent inability to devise those social and
political institutions which can enable us to apply our technical
knowledge at the rapid pace the situation demands. Here, no doubt,
lies the greatest challenge of a future without war. 45
Technological changes ordinarily have economic and social effects which
37 See WHITEHEAD, ADVENTURE OF IDEAS (1933) p. 84 (Mentor. ed. 1955).
38 See INDUSTRULISM, op. cit. supra note 18, at 266. See also generally, SEIDENBERO,
POSTHISTORIC MAN (1957).
39 HELBRONER, op. cit. supra note 21, at 206.
40 Brown, Tasks for a World Without War, in Daedalus, Fall 1960, p. 1029.
41. Id. at 1032.

42 Ibid.

43 Id. at 1037.
44

Id. at 1038.

45
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frequently require some direction or regulation by law. The American experience has generally been to bring the abuses of adverse effects of new technological practices under control in response to increasing public demand.
This is a sequence which might ordinarily be expected. We have had a striking exception to this sequence of events, however, in the atomic energy field,
wherein stringent governmental control was placed over the development of
this new energy source prior to the time it was made available for civilian
utilization.46 A number of factors, but principally its wartime development
for military purposes, seemed to require such governmental action. The subsequent treatment of nuclear energy has resulted in some significant deviations
from traditional legal patterns in order to carfy out the basic purposes of atomic
energy law. These purposes are numerous, important, and-as might be
expected-to a certain extent, conflicting." A new and highly restrictive
4
concept of information control was imposed in the atomic energy field " which
4 9 Title of special nuclear
has had extremely crucial international ramifications.
material was kept in the government,"0 and the development of nuclear weapons
was strictly controlled." The government had to undertake the extraordinary
step of providing insurance protection for the new civilian atomic energy industry, against liability for nuclear reactor accidents. 2 It was also felt necessary
to establish a unique and powerful new congressional unit, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, in order to provide a link between the highly classified activities of the Chief Executive, the Atomic Energy Commission, and
the military on the one hand, and the need for accountability to the Congress
and the American people on the other.5 "
46 See Cosway, Antitrust Provisions of the Atomic Energy Act, 12 VAND. L. Rv. 179
(1958), and Jacobs & Melchoir, Antitrust Aspects of the Atomic Energy Industry, 25 GEo.
WAsH. L. R v. 508 (1957) with respect to certain implications of the changes in the 1954
Atomic Energy Act for private enterprise.
47 "It is . . . declared to be the policy of the United States that . . . the development,
use and control of atomic energy shall be directed so as to promote world peace, improve
the general welfare, increase the standard of living, and strengthen free competition in private
enterprise." Atomic Energy Act of 1954 § 1, 60 Stat. 755 (1944), as amended, 68 Stat.
921 (1954), 42 U.S.C. § 2011 (Supp. V, 1958).
48 See discussion of this matter in Green, The Atomic Energy Information Access Permit
Program, 25 G.o. WAsH. L. REV. 548 (1957).
49 See, e.g., Symposium: Nuclear Energy and the Law, 12 VAND. L. Rv. 1 (1958),
and Symposium: Atomic Energy Law in 25 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 471 (1957). See also
Agreement with the United Kingdom on Atomic Energy: Cooperation for Mutual Defense
Purposes of August 4, 1958, 9 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 1028 (1958).
50 Section 52 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
51 Id. at §§ 91, 92.
52 Id. at § 170, Idemnification and Limitation of Liability. Dangers incident to the
operation of an atomic power reactor have proved a serious source of resistance to the
development of a private nuclear power industry. "Basically, the problem is to find a
reactor site that will be remote enough to protect the public safety in event of accident and
yet close enough to consumers to permit economical transmission of electricity." New York
Times, March 4, 1961, p. 7, col. 2. It is of interest to note in this connection that the fear
of injury from radioactivity by Soviet workers is hindering the application in Soviet industry
of various new techniques based upon nuclear physics. See New York Times, March 4,
1961, p. 33, col. 6.
53 See Review by Harold P. Green of THOMAS, AToMIc ENERGY AND CONoRESS (1956),
in 24 U. CH. L. REv. 186 (1956).
Another recent technological development, namely television, that occupies our time if
not our thoughts to the same extent as nuclear power, raises problems of a somewhat different
order but nevertheless useful for illustrative purposes as to impact on legal-policy decisional
processes. Here a scarcity of channels, at least in the commercially feasible VHF band, is
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The impact of today's rapidly developing technology raises a host of
implications for legal-policy inquiry. Is this technology contributing to a core
of unity within the diverse cultural backgrounds of the international community? Is it leading to greater rationality in the allocation and utilization of
resources? Is it tending toward standardization of conditions and practices
with the inevitable development of mass tastes and mass values? Does the
influence of standardization and large organization in certain segments of
societal activities increase or decrease the total opportunity for individual
choice? Is the over-all impact of contemporary technological developments
to render the individual a less effective political and governing unit within
the community?
Several questions are further suggested by the new technology in terms
of the mechanics of the legal-policy decisional function in addition to the foregoing inquiries, which relate primarily to the substantive effects of the technological component. With the increasing complexity of legal-policy decisions,
including the introduction of more complicated technical considerations, how
can we assure that scientific knowledge will be used to fullest advantage in
legal-policy decisions? Is the technical component and its ramifications beyond
the reach of understanding of many of our governmental policy-makers? Are
there some factors, whether technological or otherwise, over which our responsible policy officials can, in fact, exercise no control, or only minimal control?
Are there increasing numbers of decisional contexts in which the human
capacity for decision is simply too slow, cumbersome, and uncertain, to conform to tolerable limits? To what extent does -the rigid security classification
of much significant information hinder the legal-policy decisional process? And
how is a balance or organization to be created which will distinguish "expert"
from "layman" decisions, or perhaps more realistically, bring whatever specialized talents are useful and available to bear upon the resolution of major
policy questions?
The multifarious effects of the new technology have been etched or speculated upon in the foregoing discussion. The implications are so vast, complex,
and probably so decisive that this inquiry will persist until our time of crisis
has passed and settled on a relatively stable course of development. Professor
Heilbroner hits at certain fundamental social assumptions affected by the
new technology. He finds that it has done much to shatter whatever lingering
attitude of optimism we have retained and to make us question our power to
control nature and to achieve constantly improving conditions of human
betterment. 4 The idea of inevitable progress, he maintains, has suffered a
serious loss of support, despite the fact that Americans tend to be stubborn
so confining that such a legislative directive as "free competition" in the broadcasting field
has been seriously obstructed. The resulting limited number of television networks, the
attraction of national advertisers who wish to reach our mass consumption audience, and
the high cost of television programming seem to have effectively riddled the noble concept
of individual licensee responsibility for serving the public interest. See Network Broadcasting,
Report of the Network Study Staff to the Network Study Committee of the Federal Communications Commission (1957), reprinted as a report of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 85th Congress, 2nd Sess. (1958).
54 See HILBRONER Op. cit. supra note 21, at 16-31, 175.
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optimists in spite of emerging adverse forces which are substantially beyond
our control. 5 The superior war technology has, however, modified our notions
6
of progress by impressing upon us the possibility of annihilation, and the
remarkable Soviet success in science and technology has badly shaken our
confidence." Noting that the two great currents flowing in the world today
others are industrialism and the rise of popular aspirations, he finds -like
that the basic question is how we can harness science and tehnology for
legitimate social ends." To him technology is one of those great "universal
trends" which may very well carry with it egalitarian political ideas and greater
public control instead of being left to the "free market mechanism" and "profitEmphasizing that "there has been no successful revoluability" standards.
tion against technology,"60 he nevertheless feels that the social implications
of technical change can be guided if there is sufficiently early intervention by
intelligent public control. 6 ' Like others, he expresses the hope that we keep
faith in the integrity of progress by facing the present realistically and looking
forward to the future in its full perspective of dangers and opportunities. 2
Another school of thought not only analyzes the adverse effects of technological change but appears to carry out its pessimistic implications to a
further degree than Heilbroner. For example, we have this statement:
The conflict between human beings and the technical tendencies
of society is obvious enough. Yves Simon has said, "The new
rationalism born of the rationality of our technical environment
may be the least reconcilable enemy of democracy and more generally of liberty.. . .The rationalism born of technological pride
hates human liberty both on
account of its excellence and on
65
account of its wretchedness."
C.

Legal-Policy Decisional Procedures and the Scientific-Technological
Component
Serious questioning of our national policy-making machinery has arisen
in recent years, not all of which can be attributed to political motivations.
The lack of confidence manifested in the quality of much legal-policy decisionmaking springs from a variety of sources: The criticality of certain current
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HUTCHINS, Two FACES o FEDERALISM 22 (1961):
Here the two faces of federalism appear as one. Whether we aim at individual freedom or at liberty under law, we cannot accept the rationalism
of technology. Individual freedom is associated with doubt, hesitancy,
perplexity, trial and error. These technology cannot countenance. Liberty
under law presupposes the supremacy of politics. It presupposes the possibility, for example, that political deliberation might lead to the decision
to postpone the introduction of a new machine. Technology, on the other
hand, asserts that what we can do is worth doing; the things most worth
doing are those we can do most efficiently; or, in de Jouvenel's phrase,
"we should not do what is good for us, but what we are good at." Ibid.

NEW TECHNOLOGY AND NATIONAL GOALS
problems and.the unstable world power balance are highly disturbing factors,
as is the protracted psychological distress of the "cold war." It is commonplace to allude to the appalling complexity of many current problems. Some
appear so overwhelmingly unmanageable that it is easier to ignore the dificulties, or panic, than to attempt a dispassionate analysis and solution. Human
decisional capacities may not be equal to the task of maintaining a traditionally
power-structured world while simultaneously undertaking to satisfy the fresh
demands and needs of millions of people attempting to bridge the chasm from
pre-industrialism to modem society. Goals for Americans speaks of a "time
of trial" for the democratic process. 4 At home, it is noted that our successful
experiments in democracy and technology have led to the complexities of
urbanized living, the standardization of tastes and attitudes, centralization of
communications, a hypertrophy of organization, the cumulative tendencies
of which are to isolate the individual from the centers of control, and to flood
him with over-simplified and trivialized knowledge, thereby discouraging his
responsible participation." On the international scene, we are found even
less adequately prepared to cope with the sequence of events." Consequently,
the question arises as to the capacity of American democracy to maintain its
forward motion in the new decades.6" For one thing, it is stressed that the
margin for error has been greatly reduced: 6"
The democratic process is grounded on common agreement to proceed slowly through techniques of compromise and to avoid steps
which cannot be retraced. In order to work at its best, it needs
time and space - time in which to consider all points of view, to
consult all interests, to build up a clear majority, and to reassure
the reluctant minority; space to make mistakes and yet not69 do
irreparable damage to the public weal nor to private liberties.
The nature of many contemporary problems, however, requires immediate
decision; the number of important problems is increasing; and the character
of the problems makes them more difficult to decide."0 Still, such decisions
must be made. Democracy must count less heavily on spontaneity and place
greater reliance upon firm techniques of planning. "The quiet times are gone
forever; forethought, decision, and energy are the order of the day."'" It is
hopefully concluded, however, that despite the onerous new burdens being
placed on our democratic machinery, it has shown toughness, resiliency and
adaptability in the past, and can probably bear up under the strain of the
future."'
- But a steady faith in our own institutions does not remove the obstinate
probability that some problems are simply not susceptible of permanent solution or even of happy temporary adjustment and that certain social forces are
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more or less beyond our control." It is recognized that we must make some
decisions of critical importance on insufficient information, and further, that
74
every alternative course before us may have serious adverse consequences.
But if we are to try to preserve an orderly, rational, governmental process, free
of alarm and despondency, we must attempt to raise our decision-making and
prediction reliability to the highest possible degree."
The current concern with the quality of national decision-making procedures arises in large part from the complexity and critical nature of the new
technology" and its impact on the international community. 7 Such matters
73 See HEILBRONER, Op. cit. supra note 21, generally. See also, Reston, New York Times,
March 3, 1961, p. 30, col. 3; Kalb, How Mr. Kennedy Looks to the Russians, The Reporter,
December 8, 1960, p. 51.
74 That the lack of adequate information undermines the basis for intelligent decision,
both in Government and industry, in certain functional contexts, see The Research Frontier,
Saturday Review, January 7, 1961, p. 86.
75
See LEWINSOHN, PROPHETS AND PREDICTION 302-303 (1958).
76 See PRICE, GOVERNMENT AND SCIENCE 168-169 (1954), and subsequent discussion
this section, infra. While of no particularly critical importance in itself, the U.S. Atomic
Energy Commission's Projects, "Plowshare" and "Chariot," to investigate the feasibility of
using nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes by conducting an excavation experiment in
the Ogotoruk Creek, Alaska area, provides an example of the extremely complex nature of
the possible effect of the non-military application of nuclear technology. The interrelated
bioenvironmental factors involved and the possible derivative effects on plant and animal
life had to be thoroughly explored by the Commission: "The Commission would approve
conduct of this experiment only if there is assurance that it will not jeopardize the local
inhabitants or the plant and animal species from which they derive their livelihood. Final
authorization for use of nuclear explosives would be the decision of the President." See
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission Release No. D-152 of June 8, 1961. See also New York
Times, June 9, 1961, p. 15, col. 3, wherein it is stated that the A.E.C. denies that this
particular explosion would result in radioactive "fallout." See also New York Times Editorial of June 12, 1961, p. 28, col. 1, re the complexity of such safety judgments by the
A.E.C. and other responsible officials, stressing that the A.E.C. must be thorough and clear
that no danger is involved if public opinion is to support such peaceful experiments with
nuclear energy.
Issues of greater complexity due to the range of factors involved are those relating to
the possible resumption of general nuclear weapons testing, see William L. Laurence, New
York Times, June 25, 1961, p. E-7, col. 7, and the question of whether to undertake a
project to develop the "neutron bomb." See New York Times, June 25, 1961, p. 1, ol. 1.
See also, Compromise versus Decision, J.D.C. B.AR Ass'N., July, 1961, 367, 373. The
new Pentagon emphasis on speed of decision and the use of the latest systems of automatic
data processing and other electronic means of rapid, systematic decision-making required
by the contemporary military-political situation is discussed by Hanson W. Baldwin, New
York Times, April 10, 1961, p. 16, col. 2.
77 See, for example, Walter Lippmann, Washington Post, June 20, 1961, p. A-13, col. 1,
with respect to the then-impending decision as to whether to terminate negotiations with
the USSR on the "test ban" and resume the testing of nuclear devices, who, after discussing
various technical and political factors and implications of the matter states:
That the decision which the President will now have to make is not obvious, is not open-and-shut, is shown by the fact that, while warning the
Soviet Union that without a treaty we shall be free to resume testing, he
has not yet ordered testing to be resumed. For he has first to determine
whether the net balance of advantages would be substantially on our side.
See also Chase, Principles for the Nuclear Age, Saturday Review, May 20, 1961, p. 32-33,
wherein the author sets forth certain "well-authenticated facts" springing largely from the
new technology and then proceeds to formulate nineteen principles from these "technical
facts" which have "impressive logical justification" for the nuclear age, including proposals
for the construction of international governing machinery and demanding recognition that
the "outstanding principle . . . is the abandonment of national sovereignty."
It is of mildly amusing interest at first glance to note the "crisis" faced by our Government with respect to whether we should assist the Soviet Union to close its "ball-bearing
gap," or more precisely, whether the Soviets should be permitted to buy from the United
States $1,500,000 worth of newly developed, very complex machines capable of producing
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as the resumption of nuclear bomb testing,7 8 the possibilities for an adequate
disarmament inspection system,"8 the "Nth Country" problem," and such
extremely difficult judgments as determining the proportion of resources to
apply to offensive military striking power as opposed to defensive bomb shelter
strategy," are all closely tied in with technological developments. And, of
course, the incidental problems arising from spreading industrialism 2 and
urbanization' are of only a slightly lower order of importance and complexity.
The peculiar nature of certain problems can easily lead to exasperation,
as for example, the risk of adverse mutations that future generations must
assume as a result of our decision to permit nuclear weapons testing with its
accompanying release of radioactivity. 4 Another perplexing question concerns
the multitude of derivative effects which may flow from rapid transition to
automation processes, such as employee dislocation, the need for re-training,
impact on wage and work-hour structure, and changes in work and leisure
patterns.8 5 Appraisals of certain important components of the continuing national policy process are simply impossible to reduce to a confident conclusion.
Hanson Baldwin has stated that President Kennedy's request for a survey of
our military position within four weeks was, in fact, a request for a Herculean
task which could well occupy a lifetime.8 " The problem of trying to deal with
fast breaking and potentially explosive events through a lumbering bureaucracy
continues to elude our capabilities. But perhaps better means could be devised
high-precision ball bearings used predominantly in guidance systems of military missiles
and space craft. It was pointed out that this machinery might enable the Soviets to save
several years delay in closing the present gap in the "miniaturization" of their missile guidance
systems. Such skill at miniaturization enables the U. S. to reduce the thrust level of its own
missiles while securing the equivalent net results. See Washington Post, March 1, 1961, p.
C-14, col. 4. See also the assertion by Vice Admiral Hyman G. Rickover that a $2.98 toy
model of the Polaris submarine has given the Soviet Union millions of dollars worth of
information about U. S. nuclear submarines. New York Times, June 18, 1961, p. 9,
col. 1.
78 See generally The News of the Week in Review, New York Times, Sunday, June 18,
1961; and specifically, John W. Finney, U.S. Ponders: To Test or Not to Test? New York
Times, June 18, 1961, p. 4E, col. 1.
79 See Orear, A New Approach to Inspection, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March
1961, p. 107. See also special issue on Disarmament & Arms Control, Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, April 1961.
80 See Ikle, Nth"Countries and Disarmament, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, December'
1960, p. 391. See also, Nth Country World, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, April 1961,
p. 162, re A Proposal to Neutralize Nuclear Weapons, by Thornton Read, Policy Memorandum No. 22, Center of International Studies, Princeton University (1961); Porter, No
Victors, Only Victims, Saturday Review, May 20, 1961, p. 20.
81 See New York Times, January 8, 1961, p. 66, col. 6.
82 See generally, INDUSTRIALISM, supra note 18. The expanding range of industrialism
and its impact on American society is considered by Samuel P. Hays in THE RESPONSE To
INDUSTRALISM 1885-1914 (1957).
"[T]here is no better method of enlarging our understanding of other nations than to know intimately how we responded to the very forces that
millions now face elsewhere." Id. at 193.
83 See note 24 supra.
84 See Livinston and Wolfe, FAS Position on Arms Control, Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, April 1961, p. 137. See also Chase, Principles for the Nuclear Age, Saturday
Review, May 6, 1961, p. 32-33.
85 See, e.g., Arthur J. Goldberg, Secretary of Labor, Challenge of "Industrial Revolution
II," New York Times Magazine, April 2, 1961, p. 11; Man vs. The Machine, A. H. Raskin,
New York Times, January 29, 1961, p. 12E, col. 1; Glazier, Automation and the Longshoremen, The Atlantic, December 1960, p. 57; and the Washington Post, February 3, 1961,
p. A-23, col. 7, to the effect that "automation may end 4 million office jobs."
86 See New York Times, February 1, 1961, p. 16 c, col. 1.
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to deal with the unexpected crisis so as to avoid the grief of another U-2

incident."7
The alarm over our national policy structure has been sounded by many
sources. One prominant military-political observer suggests that as a society
matures, decision becomes more difficult, the area of choice more restrictive,
and the price of delay higher.8 8 Since choice is the mechanism of evolution,
we must have specific goals, a formulated plan, and the courage to make hard
decisions.8 9 Henry A. Kissinger has written:
If we seem forever on the defensive, frantically striving to stave off
disaster, and if we give the impression that we use world opinion
as a substitute for developing our own purposes, our policy will
seem to be the result of panic rather than of sober thought90
A growing dissatisfaction and impatience is evident with the increasing
number of setbacks to our national prestige, such impatience being directed
primarily at "the pedestrian pace of our bureaucratic interagency coordinating
procedures which seem to be always lagging behind the more flexible, aggressive Soviet initiatives."91 A serious question is raised as to whether our political
machinery is equipped to deal with the type of quick-response decision to which
our military striking power is geared.2
Certain observers, however, have directed their criticism to the process
of tooling the military machine, in particular to the quality of high level policy
planning and execution demonstrated in dealing with the tangled scientific,
military, and organizational problems of our missile program. 3 In this complex story, it is asserted that indecision, delay, waste of money and skilled
87 See New York Times, February 6, 1961, p. 7, col. 2, with respect to the "Santa
Maria incident." See also New York Times, May 7, 1961, p. 1, col. 7 re the establishment
of a new "cold war" operation center to keep a constant twenty-four-hour-a-day watch on
world "crisis spots." "Mr. Achilles and his staff . . . are responsible for seeing that recommendations for dealing with crisis 'are made promptly to the Secretary (of State) and
through him to the President!' The group is also charged with the duty of making certain
that the decisions reached by Mr. Rusk and President Kennedy 'are promptly implemented.'"
To the effect that one of the major "Pentagon" trends or concerns is with "greater speed
of decision," see Hanson W. Baldwin, New York Times, April 10, 1961, p. 16, col. 2.
88 See review of KISSINGER, THE NECESSITY FOR CIOIcE, by Chalmers M. Roberts,
Washington Post, January 15, 1961, p. E-6, col. 6.
89 Ibid.
90 See Kissinger, The New Cult of Neutralism, The Reporter, November 24, 1960, p.
26, 29. On a more specific level, James Reston, New York Times, March 19, 1961, p. 10-E,
col. 6, in discussing the Kennedy Administration's multitude of problems, has stated:
The Atlantic nations . . . are now at a critical point. They are under constant pressure from the Communists. They are divided into two jealous
trading blocs. Britain, France, Belgium and Portugal are all going through
extremely difficult periods with their disintegrating empires. Coincidentally, new weapons are wrecking many of the assumptions on which
the North Atlantic Treaty was based, automatic machinery is heightening
the trade war among the Allies, and the new convertibility of European
currencies is creating new opportunities and new problems in the increasingly interdependent free world.
And Walter Lippman has commented: "We have had a run of bad .news and the time has
come when we must make up our minds whether to face it and learn from it, or to shrink
from it into a nervous breakdown with suicidal tendencies." Washington Post, June 13,
1961, p. A-13, col. 1.
91 See review by C. L. Sulzberger, New York Times Book Review, February 26, 1961,
p. 7, of STRAUSz-HuPE, KINTNER AND POSSONY, A FORWARD STRATEGY Fop AMERICA.
92 Ibid.
93 See review by Walter Millis, Saturday Review, January 21, 1961, p. 64, of MEDARIS,
COUNTDOWN FOR DECISION.
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personnel, vicious infighting among governmental agencies and among large
industrial defense contractors, characterize our ponderous efforts to deal with
one of the most pressing technological problems of the present era." Such an
analysis leaves a far from complimentary evaluation of our policy and decisionmaking function in the political-military-technological field.
With respect to the question whether a democratically structured society
has the vigor and determination to respond to the demands of a world geared
to a high level military and industrial technology, it has been strongly asserted
that we are now inexorably drifting into an elite control structure without full
recognition of this fact.95 Former President Eisenhower in his Farewell Address to the Nation" warned of a war-defense oriented mentality reflected in
"ran immense military establishment ind a large arms industry" which may
be endangering our traditional pattern of civil control and accountability.
"We must guard," he said, "against the acquisition of unwarranted influence,
whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex.""
We have probably moved further toward a limited control structure
than we care to admit. Surely, some of the more critical decisions of our era
have been made by one or a relatively few men, and necessarily so. The
controversial novelist-scientist-government administrator Sir Charles Percy Snow
has written that:
One of the overwhelming facts of our time is that the cardinal
choices which lie before nations must be made by a handful of
men acting in secret. When I say cardinal choices, I mean those
which determine in the crudest sense whether we live or die- as
nations and individuals. For instance, the choice by the U.S. in
1945 to use that bomb, the choice in the Soviet Union in the late
'40s to make the fusion bomb, the choices the same countries have
made about intercontinental missiles. All these choices - and many
other choices involving science and government - were made in
secret. They had to be. All were made by a small handful of men
at the highest levels of government. All were choices made even
more difficult by the complexities of modern science. And, the most
bizarre and disturbing feature of all, these choices had to be made
or indorsed by men -presidents, prime ministers, cabinet members,
military leaders-who were not able to comprehend in depth the
scientific arguments for and against the decisions. 98
Sir Charles stresses the need for finding new means of assuring accountability
94 Ibid.
95 See New York Times, January 18, 1961, p. 22, col. 3. See also Walter Lippmann,
Washington Post, January 19, 1961, p. A-17, col. 1; and Rabinowitch, Hail and Farewell,
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 1961, p. 86-91.
96 See New York Times, January 18, 1961, p. 22, col. 3.
97 Ibid. See Washington Post, March 29, 1961, p. A-6, col. 1, "Influences" Still Busy
As Eisenhower Warned.

98

0. P. Snow, Whether We Live Or Die, Life, February 3, 1961, p. 90, adapted from

Harvard Lectures on Science and Government. In this connection see John W. Finney, New

York Times, June 25, 1961, p. 1, col. 1; "Amid considerable secrecy, a debate is being waged
within the Administration, Congress and the scientific community over a possible new
atomic warhead known as the neutron bomb." And see James Reston, New York Times,
June 28, 1961, p. 32M, col. 3, Khrushchev Provokes an Agonizing Reappraisal: "Decisions

of great importance are now in the making, but because they involve critical and complex
questions they are being taken in private. . ." See also Hanson W. Baldwin, New York
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of official actions in light of the above conditions while at the same time undertaking to demolish a variety of what might be described as democratic myths,
as for example: "Scientists used to assume, as an optimistic act of faith, that
science could only flourish in the free air. I wish it were so, but nearly all the
evidence is dead against it.... It is a pity."99 He finds fundamental fault with
what he feels is a disposition against change or, at least, an unwillingness to
orient ourselves to the future:
[W]e are living in the same world with future-directed societies.
We seem to be flexible, but we haven't any model of the future
before us. In the significant sense we don't know how to change.
And to change is what we have to do. 100
In accordance with this theme, he proposes a prominent role for scientists in
the highest echelons of government since, he reasons, they possess a forwardlooking quality which is lacking in most non-scientifically educated governmental administrators.'' In his opinion, Western society is desperately short
02
of foresight.
Times, April 10, 1961, p. 16, col. 2, re general trend toward greater secrecy in politicalmilitary affairs.
General J. B. Medaris (USA, Ret.), long associated with the Army missile development
program, has commented:
With particular respect to the public administration of technological programs, I submit that the very nature of these programs will continue to
demand greater concentration of decision-making powers into the hands
of those who have immediate knowledge of the decisions that are needed.
J.D.C. BAR Ass'N, July, 1961, p. 367, 373.
Possibly other major modem trends are also tending in the direction of a less democratic decisional structure. "We are beginning to understand that automation means more
centralized decision-making, more and more influence in the hands of fewer and fewer
people." W. H. Ferry, Director of the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions,
On the Failings of Big Business, Washington Post, March 19, 1961, p. E-4, col. 6.
99 See also Snow, op. cit. supra note 98, at 100.
100 Id. at 102.
101 Id. at 104. In June 1961, Congressman Melvin Price (D-Ill.), Chairman of the
subcommittee on research and development of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic
Energy charged that the scientific advice being given top government policy makers is too
"monolithic," with too many scientific advisers of the same point of view. He called for a
more diverse group of scientific and technical advisers with "fresh viewpoints" and suggested
that the whole policy-making mechanism in governmental areas involving scientific and
technological advice and judgments needed a complete re-examination. See Washington
Post, June 15, 1961, p. 3, col. 1. On this general subject see PRuc-, op. cit. supra note 76,
at Ch. VI- The Structure of Policy.
102 See note 98 supra. Sir Charles has also etched in the starkest terms the present
policy dilemma of the West:
We are faced with an either-or, and we haven't much time. Either we
accept a restriction of nuclear armaments. This is going to begin, just as
a token, with an agreement on the stopping of nuclear tests. The United
States is not going to get the 99.9 per cent "security" that it has been
asking for. It is unobtainable, though there are other bargains that the
United States could probably secure. I am not going to conceal from you
that this course involves certain risks. They are quite obvious, and no
honest man is going to blink them. That is the Either. The Or is not a
risk but a certainty. It is this. There is no agreement on tests. The
nuclear arms race between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. not only continues,
but accelerates. Other countries join in. Within, at the most, six years,
China and several other states will have a stock of nuclear bombs. Within,
at the most, ten years, some of those bombs are going off. I am saying
this as responsibly as I can. That is the certainty. On the one side, therefore, we have finite risk. On the other side we have a certainty of disaster.
Between a risk and a certainty, the sane man does not hesitate. . . . It
is the plain duty of scientists to explain this "Either-Or." Newsweek,
January 1, 1961, p. 75.
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Early in 1960 the Jackson Senate Sub-Committee on National Policy
Machinery undertook to seek ways for the government to act more speedily
in crucial decision-making contexts involving scientific and technological components which might "radically affect the world balance of power."1 ' Matters
of prime concern to the Sub-Committee included the delays in developing a
hydrogen bomb, and the satellite and intercontinental ballistic missile programs.10 4 Most questions posed concerned how the State and Defense Departments could furnish more useful guidance for over-all political and military
objectives without placing a straight jacket on technological development.'
Institutional changes in governmental departments were also to be studied
so as to achieve better scientific-political analysis and planning on crucial
-national problems.'
Certain moderate changes have been recommended." 7
This wide-ranging concern with decisional processes involving important
technological elements has not been overlooked by the new administration.
In President Kennedy's First Report to Congress on the State of the Union,"'
he repeatedly directed his attention to the need for a more effective organization of the governmental decision-making function, especially in the politicalmilitary sector.'
He asserted that we must make arms control the central
goal of our national policy, and that we must make certain our negotiators
are better prepared to formulate workable proposals and to make sound judgments about the proposals of others."0 He asked for international cooperation
so as "to invoke the wonders of science instead of its terrors" and invited other
nations to join with us in developing weather prediction programs, communications satellites, and in probing outer space."'
Not to be overlooked in our concern over technological complications
in the international area is the controversy over the quality of the decisionmaking processes of our various independent regulatory agencies which- to
103
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See New York Times, March 6, 1960, p. 26, col. 1.
Ibid.
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106

Ibid.
Ibid.

107 With reference to the reorganization of the National Security Council machinery
see Washington Post, December 20, 1960, p. A-16, col. 4. Re The Secretary of State and

National Policy Process, see New York Times, February 6, 1961, p. C-15, col. 1.

108 See New York Times, January 31, 1961, p. 16.
109 Ibid. See James Reston, New York Times, April 21, 1961, p. 32M, col. 4, re
President Kennedy undertaking to re-examine certain of his original assumptions about
governmental decision-making effectiveniess after the Cuban invasion fiasco. It is suggested
that "rethinking" was needed with reference to such policy decisions in view of their complexity and world-wide political-military ramifications.
The important thing is to learn from this grievous mistake (the Cuban
fiasco). We must postulate our acts on sounder information and weigh
more surely the consequences of failure. We must obscure our methods
of cold warfare and get the C.I.A. right out of public life. Democracies
can sometimes be too curious. And we must learn to obscure our official
reactions in a cooler, more studied way.
0. L. Sulzberger, And Nothing Fails Like Failure, New York Times, April 22, 1961, p. 24,

col. 4.
110 Note 108 supra.
111 Ibid. See also W. H. Lawrence,
re President Kennedy's approach to the
tive staff, including his plan for a staff
selves less with the day-to-day problems
that lie ahead.

New York Times, March 5, 1961, p. 57, col. 1,
decisional machinery within his immediate execuof "thinkahead advisers" who will concein themof the Presidency than with the potential crises
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a considerable degree - are supervising functions arising from continuing
technological advances.11 2 The President has also recommended changes in
the operations of these agencies."'
This brief review of recent events should serve as ample notice that technological advances in the past twenty years have placed enormous strains
upon our national legal-policy machinery and that the need is urgent to invent
organizational procedures and techniques of decision which will enable us to
exercise some appreciable control over rapid technological change.
D.

The Need For Cross-Disciplinary Approach to Legal-Policy Problems
In a recent Yale Medical Symposium one of the speakers, noting the
fact that there are enough nuclear weapons in existence to kill the world's.
population three times over, said:
The human race for the first time is in trouble. We're 'the first
human generation which holds veto power over continuing evolution.
The one great problem of this generation is to enlarge our loyalties
and to become members of the human race. We can never again
survive as groups competing with other groups." 14

Though some people have sounded the hopeful lyric that the very efficiency of military technology must somehow convince rational men that war
is no longer a feasible means of settling international disputes," 5 we cannot
rely upon the proposition that the efficiency of war has abolished war. The
fact that the stakes are so high and the problems so complicated has prompted
the assertion that the judgments demanded of us today are of an entirely
higher order of magnitude than in the past." 6 Consequently, new emphasis
112 See Report on Regulatory Agencies to the President-Elect by James M. Landis
(December 1960) (Senate Judiciary Committee Reprint).
See also Earl W. Kintner,
former Chairman of the FTC, Federal Administrative Law in the Decade of the Sixties,
47 A.B.A.J. 269 (1961).
113 See President Kennedy's Message to Congress on the Regulatory Agencies, New
York Times, April 14, 1961, p. 12, col. 1. See also Kennedy's Independent Regulatory
Agency Reforms, New York Times, April 16, 1961, p. 8-E, col. 1. The President's plan
to revamp the F.C.C. was killed by the House. New York Times, June 16, 1961, p. 1, col. 5.
114 New York Times, March 19, 1961, p. 76, col. 2. Statement by Dr. Brock Chisholm,
director emeritus of the World Health Organization. See also Warner Wells, M.D., Our
Technological Dilemma, or An Appraisal of Man as a Species Bent on Self-Destruction,
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November 1960, p. 362.
115
[I]f the creation of a peaceful world is to be the dominating purpose of
U. S. foreign policy- and I believe it must be because war has been made
obsolete as a way of settling disputes between nations-then the pursuit
of peace must be the all-pervading purpose of all of our acts on the
international scene. No one single policy such as disarmament is the
answer. All our major policies must work together to produce the result.
Thomas A. Finletter, FOREIGN POLICY: THE NExT PHASE, 22-23. See also Chase, op. cit.
supra, note 77.
Herman Kahn in his book ON THERMONUCLEAR WAR rejects the possibility that nuclear
weapons have replaced war as the ultimdte arbiter between nations and instead emphasizes
the probability of war, "how to prepare for it, to adjust to it, and to win it." See Marseille,
On Thermonuclear War, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, April 1961, p. 157.

116

See

CHASE,

supra note 77:

The nuclear age rests on thoroughly adequate foundations so far as natural
science is concerned. Coincidentally, it demands social changes far more
revolutionary than those following the introduction of gunpowder 500
years ago, which doomed feudalism and the armored knight. Social, political, and economic institutions have been cut adrift from their traditional
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must be placed on creating procedures and training personnel capable of dealing
with this new order of responsibility. As James Reston in the New York Times
has said, the President "is now saying that the nation needs different skills,
not for an agrarian society but for a revolutionary technological society; not
for the conquest of the frontier, but for the defense of the Union and the
conquest of the Heavens."' 17
There is growing recognition of the necessity for bringing together a wide
variety of professional backgrounds to illuminate complex problems of public
importance,"' but there is also a substantial difference of opinion as to how
this function can best be performed. At one extreme, individuals representing
all relevant disciplines may be the preferred pattern, although the idea can
moorings. Most of us; however, seem to be so many Don Quixotes, unaware that the old verities have disappeared. . . . The prime questions
posed by the nuclear age are not the U.S. against Russia, or Russia against
China, or Communism against capitalism; the prime question is the continuity of the human race. This requires a profound shift in one's value
system ...
See also, Renault St. Laurent, Q.C., President of the Canadian Bar Association, in A.B.A.J.,
November 1960, 1175, 1176:
The adoption of federalism in the United States at the end of the eighteenth
century was a landmark in the history of human self-government. It was
also a landmark in the extension of the rule of law. It seems to me that
what humanity is crying for today is another breakthrough comparable with
the invention of federalism. A breakthrough in political ideas which will
make possible the extension of the rule of law to the whole world.
and
The most exciting thing in Europe today is Britain's slow but steady movement toward joining the European Economic Community (Common
Market) and throwing over 500 years of history to make common cause
with Europe. This is more than an economic movement; in fact, all the
economic jargon surrounding it has tended to obscure the central fact that,
like our own founding fathers in Philadelphia, these men are talking
about forming 'a more perfect union.' This is, in short, another of those
moments in history when great decisions are in the making. . . . The
Continent is in flux. The possibilities are great, but once again the West
needs the unifying engine that can adapt their work to the even greater
and more menacing forces of the twentieth century.
James Reston, New York Times, June 7, 1961, p. 38-M, col. 3, urging that political
arrangements be devised which will be adaptable to social change, as contrasted with the
static concept of the Congress of Vienna of 1815.
On the neglected but badly needed function of policy planning, see Saville Davis, How
the Scientists Have Prodded Lagging Politicians Along the Trail, Saturday Review, December 10, 1960, p. 57: "One point is plain: the procedures of the recent past have been
notably inadequate to the need. There are two aspects to this shortcoming, in immediate
operation and in long-range planning." See also by same author Recent Policy Making in
the United States Government, Daedalus, Fall 1960, p. 951, 965-966.
See Born, Physics & Politics, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, June 1960, p. 194, 199,
wherein the author calls for the type of revolutionary conceptual thinking in political system
that has taken place in science: "What should come now is an attempt to apply to politics
methods of reversed thinking successfully used in physics, and to point out seemingly irreconcilable contradictions as complementary and reconcilable situations."
117 New York Times, February 26, 1961, p. 8E, col. 4.
118 "Government, to be effective, demands an understanding, cooperative relationship
among men of various educational backgrounds and experience to mount a constructive
unified attack on the policy and administrative problems which the specialists, and the
general administrator and politician, are together called to solve." President Nathan M.
Pusey of Harvard, New York Times, January 15, 1961, p. E-11, col. 3, discussing Harvard
University programs which "emphasize the way in which the various scholarly specialists
of a university can be brought together to illuminate complex problems of public importance and put the experience of scholars at the service of those of diverse background who
are grappling with the solution of governmental problems."
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be advanced, however difficult to implement, that there must be some professionals in national policy-making positions and on graduate school faculties
who combine the learning and talents of multiple skills. This new order of
competence will, no doubt, take many shapes. A former scientific advisor to
the President, commenting on the close relationship of science to national
policy decisions, has stressed the importance of having relevant scientific facts
properly interpreted to the ultimate political decision-maker, and indicated
that the question of interpretation may well depend on a new breed of men
who must rise to resolve it." 9 [Italics added]
Certainly lawyers will have an important role to play at the legal-policy
level wherein problems having significant technological components must be
analyzed and appropriate courses of action recommended. On many such problems a lawyer's special skills will be indispensable in devising the most effective
alternative solutions, in finding workable arrangements, in bringing order out
of human confusion. 2 But to be of maximum effectiveness in such decisional
contexts, the lawyer must have the capacity to understand the significance of
a wide range of diverse and apparently disconnected factors, to organize and
appraise these factors and place them in a framework in which the possible
119 See Kistiakowsky, Where is Science Taking Us? Saturday Review, December 10,
1960, p. 61:
Another kind of individual must be added to the team: An individual
trained in the usual disciplines of the foreign service, but literate in
science. The general opinion is that science is too specialized to provide
scientific inputs to policy formulation except as advice from practicing
scientists on an ad hoc basis. I submit that as valuable as such advice is,
it does not fill today's requirements for a continuing and intimate involvement in the policy-making process of competent people who understand
science and its significance to policy enough to work effectively with the
practicing scientists supplying the specialized ad hoc studies. We have
entered a new era . . . in which science and technology are transforming
our way of life and the relations between nations. Scientists and other
enlightened citizens cannot stand aside and simply watch this process,
regardless of where it takes us; we must and we can use science and
technology to achieve the humanistic goals of our free society.
"Modern technological advances have increased the importance of mind over muscle in
getting things done, . . . and demands on Government career aides are expanding as the
jobs Government has to get done expand in importance." Secretary of State Dean Rusk,
New York Times, April 12, 1961, p. 11, col. 2.
That "new thinking" must take place in U.S. foreign policy, see FINLETTER, FOREIGN
PoLIcy: THE NEXT PHASE (THE 1960's) 3 (1960).
"We are in a situation where we
have no choice other than to rise to greatness." Id. at 227. See also, Price, op. cit. supra
note 76, at 203.
120
The lawyer's training and experience fit him especially well for the tasks
of translating knowledge into responsible action, of choosing among contingent alternative courses of action, of guiding action through the formulation of policy and law, of institution building. The research approach
of the lawyer cannot be that of the physical scientist nor even that of
the social scientist. The scientist proceeds on assumptions (tested by experience) that the world is ordered, that this order is to be discovered
by him and that from his observation and controlled experiments he
can draw generalizations that have universal validity. The lawyer, in
contrast, proceeds on assumptions that order has to be created, that the
contingency of alternative potential orders has to be resolved through
action based on responsible judgment, and that this requires the participation and active collaboration of those among whom relations are to be
ordered.
See Howard, International Legal Studies, 26 U. CHI. L. REV. 577, 592 (1959).
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choices can be illuminated.121 This type of analysis or "planning" is the indispensable device whereby the responsible official can be made aware of the
probable consequences of his decisions before he makes them instead of afterwards. 2 Not solutions so much as delineating feasible alternative courses of
action would seem to be a job that lawyers, even through traditional training,
are reasonably well equipped to do. No profession is fully qualified for the
job of examining, criticizing and evaluating problems at the legal-policy level.
But the basic LL.B. education does provide an analysis framework for systematic decisional procedures which is highly useful in bringing together and
organizing material from almost every facet of human experience. Even so,
at the higher reaches of legal education there is obvious need for greater
emphasis on related professional skills, the types of problems they undertake
to solve, their frareworks for analysis and techniques of decision. The sheer
complexity of much legal-policy problem-solving and of developing training
techniques which might improve this skill would seem -to call for a decisionmaking approach rather than any static system of fixed rules or formulae. 2"
As has been noted, what we most need are more adequate "models for change,"
models that deal with the total context of a problem rather than with a partial
and, by itself, sterile legal dimension.

24

It is doubtful that the legal profession and the law schools, especially
those which are equipped to give advanced graduate work, can any longer
dismiss the demand for a more systematic approach to training for the legalpolicy decisional level. Assertions that such matters are so complex as to be
unteachable, or that no systematic means can be found to handle such problems, or that such and such a problem falls into another professional field, or
that it simply gets down to a matter of arbitrary judgment, or that a judgment
is required that only experience can satisfy, or that one can never obtain all
of the relevant information for such judgments, may have some kernel of
validity but are hardly satisfactory reasons for indifference in today's fast mov-

ing world where every educational resource and every unit of trained intelligence is needed to cope with the situation. There may never be an entirely
happy solution to the problem of where and how much to spend on space
research, but we realize that a choice must be made and we should use whatever rationality we have to do a systematic job.
In view of the concern over governmental decisional machinery during
121

See, for example, Lasswell, The World Revolution of Our Time: A Framework For
ASSOCIATES, STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC
(1960).
See BLACK, THE DIPLOMACY OF ECONOmIC DEVELOPMENT 25, 32, 35 (1960).

Basic Policy Research (1951); McDOUGAL &
ORDER

122
123

There appears to be a definite trend toward increasing recognition of the decisional
STUDIES IN WORLD
PUBLIC ORDER (1960); HART, THE LEGAL PROCESS (Tentative Edition 1958); AUERBACK,

approach at the legal-policy level. See, e.g., MCDOUGAL & ASSOCIATES,

AL., THE LEGAL PROCEss-AN
INTRODUCTION
TO DECISION-MAKING
(1961).
See
also Fordham, Legal Education and the Advancement of Law, Legal Institutions, and Legal
Processes, 13 J. LEGAL ED. 172 (1960).
124 Concern with the "process of change" is a major characteristic of the "research
philosophy" approach of the Center for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology. See Ninth Annual Report, 1959-1960, p. 43, 45. See also Henry A. Kissinger,
The Next Summit Meeting, Harper's Magazine, December 1960, p. 60; C. P. Snow, op. ait.
supra note 98.
ET
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the past few years and the prospect of issues becoming more, not less, complicated, it would appear likely that increasing attention will be given by most
professional schools, as well as industry and governmental units, to the invention and managing of decisional machinery and techniques- the function of
determining the nature of the problem and mobilizing the facilities and skills
Decisional managers will not necessarily
necessary for a complete analysis.'
be lawyers, of course, but there will be constant need for the lawyer's skills
at the legal-policy level of decision, and the better grasp the lawyer has of
the total decisional context, the more effective part he can play in this operation. It does point to a new dimension in professional training.
Assuming the need for major emphasis to be placed on the decisional

function in professional legal training, especially in the "public law" sector,
several inquiries are immediately posed relating to: principles of staff organization; channelling information; types and levels of expert advisory assistance;
function of the "staff" as information processor, advisor or planner; locus of
decisional sequences within the organization; composition of the final decisionmaking unit; appraisal of the ultimate decision product with respect to efficiency of operation, quality of judgment made, etc. In addition, at least three
component functions of the decision process need continuing if not greatly
extended consideration, namely: 1) Goal-value clarification, the reduction of
general goals to concrete operational indices and the necessary interplay between postulated goals and the means of their achievement; 2) Conceptual
thinking, particularly in terms of "models" of societal activities which will
provide some insight into the consequences of alternative policy projections,
and; 3) The employment of the newly developed communications theories
and informational skills and techniques which should vastly improve the level
of relevant information upon which judgments can be made. Only the second
of these can be considered briefly herein.
Conceptual-MOdel Thinking at the Legal-Policy Level
In Goals for Americans a so-called "Imperative of Responsibility" is
spoken of as the indispensable element in the conduct of those having control
over the critical matter of nuclear weapons employment." 6 Maturity of judgment and prudence are the essentials. Goals adds:
E.

125 See PicE, op. cit. supra note 76, at 93, wherein the author calls for a new type
of governmental administrator who can confidently evaluate policy problems having important
scientific and technological components and suggests a new synthesis of studies in "controls
systems" or systems analysis. He states with respect to such an administrator that "He has
to consider not only the scientific and engineering and commercial systems, but also how
they may be managed in relation to political, legal, economic, and diplomatic problems."
Id. at 94. A much better qualified administrative corps is called for, though not a closed
administrative elite. The idea is advanced that good administrators come from highly
diverse backgrounds. Id. at 188. For a special indication of this trend see New York Times,
June 1, 1961, p. 8, col. 2 re statement of Dr. John R. Pierce of the Bell Laboratories that:
Top-notch human brains will be needed henceforth to make wise use of
computers . . . (wise decisions) certainly cannot be made by even a bright
specialist ii management unless that specialist is willing to devote years
of hard effort to learning things quite outside of his specialty, things that
have to do with machines and systems of machines, with data and information, rather than with organizations of people and human idiosyncracies.
126 GOALS FOR AmERICANS 75 (1960).
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So, too, must the "imperative of anticipation," for these same
decision-makers and administrators must have a perception of the
future, a grasp of the predictable and an instinct for the unpredictable, that managers of the democratic process have not found
quite so necessary to cultivate in the past. The stumbling reaction
of our government to the immense legal and administrative problems raised by the swift advance toward practical exploitation of
outer space is example enough of the need for a new order of
imagination all through the structure of democracy.1 2 [Italics
added]
While some professional training may be oriented toward the type of conceptual or "model-thinking" that would assist in achieving this quality of judgment, our legal training would seem to be somewhat deficient in its lack of
emphasis on this phase of legal-policy decision-making.
"Model" may be given a variety of meanings but has ordinarily, in scientific and technical literature, been employed to denote the representation of
a segment of reality. 2 That is, it refers to aspects of actual behavior or events
or to how certain functions are, in fact, performed rather than to preference
statements as to how such functions should be performed."'9 In discussing
"models" in this sense, one is primarily concerned with facts (conditions, trends,
inter-relationship of variable-factors, projections and predictions of factual
consequences) rather than goals or values"' although a model might be formu127 Id. at 76.
128 See BRoss, DESIGN FOR DECISION (1953): Ch. 10 discusses the character and various functions of models and the more common types: abstract, symbolic, mathematical, and

statistical. Dahl, Hierarchy, Democracy, and Bargaining, in PoLrTics AND EcoNomics 45,
(Brookings Lecture, 1955), emphasizes need for models of the three foregoing "systems"
in his title. Dahl discusses the relationship of models to reality and acknowledges that models
for analysis of social processes must necessarily oversimplify. Id. at 67-68.
SHUBIK, READINGS IN GAME THEORY AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR (1954), seeks "common
properties of all decision-making situations":
The materials should be viewed as being coherent parts of an exercise
in exploring the utilities of certain types of analytical models in the
description and explanation of social behavior. Therefore the reader
should consider the nature, advantages, and methodological limitations
of such models and, especially, the relationship between the models and
reality. . . . The reader may catch himself exclaiming, "But real life is
not like this; how can game theory be of any use?" If so, he should
remember that no model, of whatever sort, even purports to reproduce the
real world in all its detail. Rather, it is a means of spotlighting and
examining selected properties of real situations by postulating what would
happen if the model did accurately portray behavior. In accounting for
discrepancies between models and empirical events, models are improved
and actual behavior is more satisfactorily explained.
One of the better known and most discussed "models" is, of course, the "competitive
model" of the traditional "free enterprise" economy. See for discussion and subsequent
modifications, GALBRAITH, op. cit. supra note 22, Chapters II, III, & IV.
129 See generally BRoss, op. cit. supra note 128, ch. 10. See also, HANSON, PATTERNS
op DIscovERy: AN INQUIRY INTO THE CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS O1 SCIENCE (1958),
wherein the author expounds his theme that there is a logical pattern to finding theories
(models) just as there is in using established theories to make deductions and predictions.
Id. at 70. He stresses that "physicists do not start from hypotheses; they start from data."
Ibid. To Hanson, formulating a theory is the same as seeking intelligibility, pattern or
organization. Id. at 87.
130 As for example, HANSON, op. cit. supra note 129, at 89 states: "Triumphs in contemporary physics consist in discovering that one parameter can be regarded as a function
of some other one." But it is, of course, evident that the Is and the Ought, that Fact and
Value are interacting elements in most decisional processes. Their separate consideration
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lated on the basis of postulated factors or even of a conceptual structure or
hypothesis for the purpose of analyzing certain data or for verification as to
its accuracy of representation."' A model then becomes a tool of purposive
rational action; depending upon its adequacy, it brings order and arrangement
into a confused factual context; it provides for a meaningful organization of
relevant factors and assists in ordering relationships between variables. Frequently, the major significance of a model is as a formula for predicting consequences of given courses of action." 2
Lawyers and law students are, of course, familiar with the concept of
"model," or most certainly should be in that they have been exposed to models
of man, models of society, models of various jurisprudential systems, and, most
surely, to models of judicial decision-making.'
But there seems to be a
is, however, most helpful to a clarity of analysis in many types of legal-policy problems.
For an excellent discussion of the tendency of the Is and the Ought to be merged in judicial decision-making see MILLER AND HOWELL, supra note 23, at 665-667.
131 See HANSON, op. cit. supra note 129, wherein the author uses the terms abduction
and retroductionto describe "studying facts and devising a theory to explain them." Id. at 85.
What is it to supply a theory? It is to offer an intelligible, systematic,
conceptual pattern for the observed data. The value of this pattern lies
in its capacity to unite phenomena which, without the theory, are either
surprising, anomalous, or wholly unnoticed.
Id. at 121. See also BROSS, op. cit. supra note 128, at 161-174.
132 See BRoss, op. cit. supra note 128, at 37, 165, 169; Dahl, op. cit. supra note 128
at 68 re predicting in terms of cost and gains; HANSON, op. cit. supra note 129, at 71, 72, 91;
LEWINSOHN, PROPHETS AND PREDICTION (1958), at 49-50 (methods of prediction), 276279 (models as "conditional predictions"), 284 (success with prediction in economic models),
290 (projections in industrial operations), 304 (the "future of prediction"), 306 (restricting
"chance"), and 308 with respect to the development of effective methods of prediction in
the technological area. The author states: ". . . the sphere of unpredictable events is
rapidly contracting." Ibid. See also SHUBIK, op. cit. note 128:
Game theory offers a way of thinking systematically about the limiting
conditions under which choices must be made. . . . Game theory assumes
that the conflict or competition element in political situations can be measured with precision and that often results can be predicted. [Italics added].
On models and their use in prediction see Introduction to the Nature of Game Theory, Id.
at 1. See also, Fleisher, The Influence of Technology on Urban Forms, in Symposium: The
Future Metropolis, Daedalus, Winter 1961, p. 48; New York Times, April 3, 1961, p. C-11,
col. 1, re the development of a mathematical "input-output" technique (model) for predicting the degree of economic dislocation that substantial disarmament would produce in
the nation. Such predictions have a use in guiding policy makers in government and industry
with respect to certain assumptions made regarding disarmament measures. See also Harrison
E. Salisbury's review of VERNON, METROPOLIS 1985, New York Times, November 13, 1960,
p. 3:
The author is careful to avoid absolutes. He concedes that even the most
careful and scientific projections are inherently subject to major error.
But, as he adds, "a careful guess is better than a heedless one; and our
guesses may provide a better basis for major business and government
decision. .. . Without necessarily accepting the final numbers we generate
some may find our intermediate judgments of some value!"
For a critical assessment of the status of social and behavioral science in the handling of
"predictability" and "control" analysis, see Russell Kirk, Is Social Science Scientific? New
York Times Magazine, June 25, 1961, p. 11. But for a glowing report on the possibilities
of social behavior models for long-range forecasting see Thomas B. Morgan, The PeopleMachine, Harper's, January 1961, p. 53, wherein the "simulation" of voter response to
controversial public issues is described.
133 See, e.g., COHEN & COHEN, READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY
(1951), Ch. 6: The Nature of the Judicial Process; PATTERSON, JURISPRUDENCE: MEN
AND IDEAS OF THE LAW (1953), Part V, The Judicial Process; FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL
(1949); CARDOZo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921); O'MEARA, NATURAL
LAW AND EVERYDAY LAW, 5 NATURAL LAW FoRUm 83 (1960).
For recent studies see AUERBACK,

(1961);

GARRISON, HURST AND MERMIN, THE LEGAL PROCESS
WASSERSTROM, THE JUDICIAL DECISION (1961); SCHUBERT, QUANTrrATIvE ANALY-
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tendency, perhaps for good reason, to merge the predictive and valuative components of the decisional process in legal thinking,"3 4 as for example, in such
"standards" as the "reasonable man" or the "public interest." It is suggested
here that lawyers, and especially those moving into the Public Law legal-policy
sector, should place greater stress on model thinking and the predictive element.
Developing a sensitivity to social movement (trend thinking) aiid to relationships between or among factor-variables (scientific thinking) would seem
essential for a confident grasp of legal-policy problem contexts." 5 We permit
the predictive element to remain ambiguous with resulting loss in rational
judgment. Whatever concept we entertain of our own decisional process, we
inevitably proceed on certain assumptions, draw images, and make predictions,
whether conscious or unconscious, in arriving at decisions. It is urged, therefore, that this component of the decisional process be made more explicit.
Whether or not lawyers have contributed a proportional share to the
legal-policy model-making function of recent years,'
there has clearly been
no lack of such effort by others. Scientists, mathematicians, political scientists,
social scientists, city planners, and particularly, economists have given us models
of such actual or postulated patterns of, conditions and activities as: the present
world political configuration - of enemies, allies and neutrals; 3 7 of the USSR
SIS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR

(1959).

716 (1960), of WESTIN, THE

See also Review by Clement E. Vose, 69 YALE L.J.
which discusses

ANATOMY OF A CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASE,

various "models of judicial decision-making."

134
135

See

MILLER AND HOWELL,

supra,note 23.

With reference to the importance of "trend" studies, see McDougal, The Comparative

Study of Law for Policy Purposes: Value Clarification as an Instrument of Democratic World
Order, 1 Am. J. COmP. LAw 24, 25, 29 (1952). See also LASSWELL, THE WORLD REVOLU-

A FRAMEWORK FOR BASIC POLICY RESEARCH 4-5, 28-39 (1951). (Re
"Developmental Constructs").
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In social policy the operations most closely linked with engineering -like
city or regional planning-have been accustomed to regard the preparation of models as an indispensable part of the decision process. But social
and behavioral scientists, in general, have been dilatory in perceiving the
advantages of model building .... It is reasonable to say that among social
scientists, political scientists and lawyers have been slow to use the model
building technique of the engineers because political scientists are especially
aware of the complexity of the social process. (Unfortunately this explanation does not apply to scholars who shrink from examining social contexts,
and who escape into formalism.)
Harold D. Lasswell, Technique of Decision Seminars, 4 MIDWEST J. POL. SCI. 213, 221-222
(1960).
137 See, e.g., AMERICAN STRATEGY FOR THE NUCLEAR AGE (Hahn and Neff, ed.), (1960).
See also series of two articles by Otto Feinstein, American Scholars Analyze U.S. Foreign
Policy, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, December 1960, p. 395 and January 1961, p. 30,
wherein the author analyzes several recent studies which include concepts and "models"
of international power relations, of world social and economic change, of the impact of
technology on social structure, of socio-political resistance to change, of the USSR and its
probable capability and disposition to respond to certain eventualities, and of U.S. strategies
for coping with rising antagonisms and social change abroad.
Walter Lippman, Washington Post, June 13, 1961, p. A-13, col. 1, points out the crucial
distinction we must draw between the Communistic movement on the one hand and the
world-wide social revolution on the other. Asserting that Mr. Khrushchev and Communism
need not be the "locomotive of history," he states: "The wave of the future is not Communist domination of the world. The wave of the future is social reform and social revolution
driving towards the goal of national independence and equality of personal status." See
New York Times, April 23, 1961, p. E-3, col. 6, re review of Soviet basic policy assumptions
including the inevitability of eventual Soviet triumph in the world power arena and the
probable avoidance of nuclear war. See also New York Times, June 18, 1961, p. 3-E, col. 1
TION OF OUR TIME:

Moscow's View: Strength of Soviet Indicates That Communism Is the "Wave of the Future."
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and its internal decisional structure;"38 of the relationship of the USSR to Red
China;.. 9 of Soviet Man and of Western Man; 4 of the unfolding operations
and prospective results in event of nuclear war;' 4 ' of the possibilities of accidental war; 42 of the operations of the deterrent concept and of graduated
response;"' of the probable operations of various disarmament arrangements;'"
of the consequences of continued nuclear weapons testing on mutational changes
138 See Inside the Soviet Economy, Saturday Review, January 21, 1961, p. 21. See also,
Hahn and Neff, op. cit. supra note 2, at Part Three: Communist Strategy and Tactics, with
special reference to Kintner, The Orchestration of Crisis, p. 105. In connection with the
Hahn and Neff collection, AMERICAN STRATEGY FOR THE NUCLEAR AGE

(1960), see Lyons

and Morton, School For Strategy, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 1961, p. 103,
wherein the Institute for American Strategy and its relationship to the Foreign Policy Research Institute of the University of Pennsylvania and the publication of the Hahn and
Neff book is discussed:
The significance of American Strategy for the Nuclear Age lies in its analysis of the international situation and its appeal for direct action. To a
very large extent, the theme depends on the particular estimate of Soviet
intentions that is presented and the particular prophecy of the Communist
future that is forecast.
The shorthand label for this particular model is that of "Protracted conflict." Id. at 104.
139 See Kennan, Stalin and China, The Atlantic, May 1961, p. 35; Crankshaw, Khrushchev and China, The Atlantic, May, 1961, p. 43.
140

See GANTRIL, SOVIET LEADERS & MASTERY OVER MAN

(1960),

with special attention

to the Epilogue p. 151-157. See also Arnold J. Toynbee, Spiritual Freedom is the Great
Difference, New York Times Magazine, January 15, 1961, p. 8: "The toleration of minority
beliefs made the Western world what it is. The difference from Russia is vital."
141 See KAHN, ON THERMONUCLEAR WAR 576 (1960):

If we are to anticipate, ward off, and prepare for crisis and trouble, if we
are to design for safer and better security systems, if we are to control
our destiny, we will need much better mechanisms than we have had for
forward thinking, for imaginative research into problems of strategy and
foreign policy, and for anticipating future technical and military developments and planning to meet them.
For a highly critical comment on Kahn's study see A Moral Tract on Mass Murder, by
James R. Newman, Washington Post, February 26, 1961, p. E-7. See also TURNER AND
CHALLENER,

NATIONAL

SECURITY IN

THE NUCLEAR

AGE:

BASIC

FACTS

AND

THEORIES

(1960); Broido, Mass Fires Following Nuclear Attack, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
December 1960, p. 409.
142 See Rabinowitch, Accidental War, Missiles, and World Community, Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists, June 1958, p. 212; Leghorn, The Problem of Accidental War, Id. at 205;
Phelps, The Danger of Accidental War, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, April 1961, p. 146.
Accidental war is often adduced as a powerful motive for disarmament.
The multiplication and dispersion of. ever more powerful weapons seems
to carry an ever growing danger of accidental war; and many who are
confident that deliberate attack is adequately deterred are apprehensive
about the accidental-wai possibilities inherent in the arms race. . . . We
ought to cultivate the enemy's belief that we shall respond to what may
be the opening moves in a general war with deliberate care and control
and sensitivity to what is going on, not with an instant, all-out, indiscriminate effort to destroy all the enemies who may have been involved.
Thomas 0. Schelling Meteors, Mischief, and War, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September 1960, p. 292. See also Washington Evening Star, April 5, 1961, p. 1, col. 2, and
the New York Times, April 5, 1961, p. 1, col. 1, with reference to the organizational steps
taken by Secretary of Defense McNamara to prevent "false alarm war" and to retain "tight
contror' over our retaliatory action in case of an apparent enemy attack. The Secretary
had, at this time, two sets of recommendations under consideration designed to devise a
mechanism to provide for "controlled response and negotiating pauses in the event of thermonuclear attack," and "to insure that the command and control system and its equipment
will permit duly constituted authorities to react to an attack in a deliberate position."
143 See note 142 supra. See also articles in special section on Science and Military
Strategy in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May 1956, p. 138; Schelling, The Retarded
Science of International Strategy, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 1960, p. 103.
144 See Symposium: Arms Control, Daedalus, Fall 1960. See also, Disarmament- Comparison of Soviet and Western Proposals, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, October 1960,
p. 336, and numerous other articles appearing in this periodical during the past several years.
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in future generations; 4 of the pre-industrial nations and their apparent movement toward totalitarianism or democratic processes; 46 of the impact of auto4
147
and of the trend to urbanization.'
mation on employees and on industries;
Whatever the comprehensiveness, adequacy and reliability of these models
of significant social and power processes, the irrefutable fact remains that if
rational thought is to be applied to such matters, there must be some basis
for predicting the movement of events and the probable results of certain eventualities, this being the basis both for formulating feasible alternatives and
predicting the probable consequences of such courses of action.' 49 Continuing
145

See

BARNET, WHo WANTS DISARMAMENT? (1960):
Would a moratorium or a ban on the testing of nuclear weapons increase
confidence and provide a basis for genuine disarmament? Supporters of
this measure have given primary emphasis to the necessity of reducing the
world radiation hazard rather than the political implications of stopping
the tests. Soviet propaganda has insisted that an immediate end to the
tests is essential to remove the immediate threat of harmful genetic changes.
Many scientists in the United States agree with this position. Others take
a more conservative view. All are agreed, however, that any substantial increase in the world radiation level is highly undesirable.
Id. at 107. See Letter to Editor, New York Times, April 4, 1961, p. 36-M, col. 7, by Ralph
E. Lapp suggesting that U. S. ballistic missile bases be so located that "fall out" patterns
of enemy missiles impacting near such sites will not spread over large population centers.
See also, Morgan, Human Exposure to Radiation, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November
1959, p. 384; Problems Presented by Radioactive Fallout, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
June 1959, p. 258; 18 Questions and Answers About Radiation, Atomic Energy Commission
(1961), question 11. What is the Source of "Fallout?"
That nuclear testing and the disposal of radioactive waste is no longer an isolated
national question, see Wells, Our Technological Dilemma, or, An Appraisal of Man as a
Species Bent on Self-Destruction, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November 1960, p. 362,
364-65. Some prominent scientists, however, minimize the danger of nuclear testing. See
Edward Teller, Washington Post, June 24, 1961, p. A-15, col. 7.
146 Specifically, see RoSTow, THE STAGES OF ECONOMIC GRowTH 134 (1960).
147 See note 85, supra.
148 See Symposium: The Future Metropolis, Daedalus, Winter 1961, specifically, Fleisher,
The Influence of Technology on Urban Forms, p. 48.
149 Policy alternatives are more or less defined by the model adopted. For example,
Herman Kahn, who rejects the idea of total annihilation for that of substantial human survival after a nuclear exchange has proposed that $500,000,000 on an annual basis be provided for civil defense. See New York Times, May 19, 1961, p. 2, col. 4.
For another example of the policy implications stemming from given conceptions of
"human nature" see Porter, No Victors, Only Victims, Saturday Review, May 20, 1961, p.
20, discussing Warburg, Disarmament: The Challenge of the Nineteen Sixties (1961) and
Hadley, The Nation's Safety and Arms Control (1961):
The arms control school, according to Warburg's analysis, believes that
"human nature" makes war inevitable but that it can be limited in sc6pe
and in the nature of the weapons employed. The disarmament school
denies that war in a thermonuclear age can be limited or controlled and
asserts that abolishment of war can only be done through universal disarmament and adequately enforced world law ....
At bottom, arms control,
in Warburg's view, is a theory created by wistful men who can't accept
that war is obsolete but who do recognize that in war's modern form there
can be no victors, only victims; and who, not without reason, question
man's ability to settle disputes among nations judicially through a supranational organization.
On the two prevailing concepts or models of USSR strategy and the practical consequences
of each view with respect to US policy toward Cuba, see Edward Crankshaw in the Washington Post, May 8, 1961, p. A-16, col. 6. Mr. Crankshaw describes Khrushchev's thinking
as seen by Walter Lippman as that of viewing current social and political unrest as an
inevitable revolutionary movement with Communism the predetermined victor. Hence, the
USSR leaders are relatively unconcerned with such temporary and local complexities as
Laos and Cuba. President Kennedy's supposed view is contrasted and described as seeing
the tactical picking-off of vulnerable areas by subversion and infiltration as the major preoccupation of the USSR.
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scholarly reassessment of such conditions and processes is essential to rational
policy-making. The writer of a survey of several studies of American foreign
policy, prepared at the request of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
concludes by stating:
The findings of these reports are very important . . . we see that

scientific, technological, and social changes are increasing rapidly,
and are profoundly affecting the world situation and our position
in it. Our relative economic and military power has declined, the
problems of the underdeveloped countries are increasing, and
European stability is far from certain. At the same time the Soviet
Union is not only increasing in power, but is developing into a
far more complex society than we had believed possible; the same
is true for China. This world reality is far different from the one
5 0
presented by our press and government.Y
[Italics added]
Lawyers involved in international legal-policy problems will surely find
two recent studies by economists stimulating and meaningful for the models
they construct. While it is still necessary to analyze international problems in
terms of power relations, models such as that of W. W. Rostow in his Stages
of Economic Growth, take change rather than the status quo as the basic
assumption, and accept certain balance of power shifts on the world scene
as inevitable.' 5' New ideas and new technologies are beating against the old
social and political structures of the pre-industrial nations, Rostow finds, and
are making substantial headway, aided by the spread of literacy, increasing
use of information media, and the pressure of population growth.'52 If the
"take-off" into industrialism is prevented or frustrated, this inevitable change
will eventually erupt in drastic or violent form.'
Policy judgments should,
therefore, undertake to guide or contain such change rather than suppress it.
A second study by four eminent economists entitled Industrialism and
Industrial Man 5 4 creates a comprehensive model of the movement toward
industrialism with all of its consequent commitments. From this "model of
change," the authors derive or project a wide range of highly significant developments in societal organization and function. It is not productive to argue
whether such extrapolations are or are not correct. It can be said that there
is substantial evidence to support the model and considerable plausibility in
the deductions and projections therefrom. Until a more plausible model is
invented, this study offers legal scholars a highly suggestive array of trend
material for analysis in terms of impact on legal system. The value of such
models is that, if skillfully utilized, they offer a possible means by which the
legal-policy participant can get into the van of events and bring the legal
factor into play to shape, to some degree, important social trends instead of
being dragged along by them.
Industrialism and Industrial Man is packed with provocative extrapola150 Feinstein, American Scholars Analyze US Foreign Policy, Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, January 1961, p. 30, 34.
151 See RosTow, op. cit. supra note 146.
152 See Feinstein, op. cit. supra note 150, at 396.
153 Ibid.
154 Note 18 supra. The four authors are Clark Kerr, John T. Dunlop, Frederick H.
Harbison, and Charles A. Myers.
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dons. The model of "pluralistic industrialism" is discussed in terns of a number of striking assumptions and projections, as for example: the sources of
uniformity; the threads of diversity; the state that does not wither away; the
crucial role of productive enterprise; the expanding "web of rules"; the movement from class war to bureaucratic gamemanship; "associated man" and the
shift from class to special interest group identification; and the organization
man and the new boheniianism."' These -generalities are reduced to meaningful and specific criteria. Extrapolation into the future poses the eternal
tension between the forces promoting uniformity and those perpetuating diversity. Industrialism is offered as a powerful source of uniformity."' Strong
conflicting ideologies tend to fade and sharp ideological alternatives cease to
be posed about the "best way" to organize industrial society. Unworkable
utopias give way to a more pragmatic realism. "Solutions are negotiated among
representatives of leading interest groups rather than fought out on the level
of principle. . . . The negotiator takes the place of the prophet, the idealist,
the demagogue."'
The administrative functions grow in maturity and administrators become increasingly skilled. "Balance" among competing power
centers is the crucial continuing problem. Debate on ideological principle gives
way to compromise over more mundane demands. Societal organization under
whatever name is essentially "guided." A broad consensus prevails.'
The model of "pluralistic industrialism" further postulates that as industrialism develops, the requirement of higher education skills becomes manifest,
and that this possibility for all men to become literate carries with it a more
common equality, not linked to ideology, and a stronger individual stake in
personal independence. 5 ' Large-scale organization, whether public or private,
run by professional managers, is a cardinal characteristic.' 60 Such managers
will be primarily responsible for the "web of rules" which is a universal phenomonon of industrialized society. 6 ' The state, also, will grow in importance.
"Industrialization has been accompanied by the growth of the directing, guiding, managing state as never before so universally in history."' 62
The "compulsion toward comparison" will accelerate in force, such pressures developing regardless of culture and ideology - carried, and reinforced
by new communication and transportation technologies. The authors state:
The thrust of progress also serves the cause of uniformity ...
The rising standard of living and increasing leisure create the
capacity to read and travel and compare. .63
People may not be willing to setlle for much less in their own
systems than the standards and performance in competing systems. 6 4
155
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Id. at Chapter 10: Pluralistic Industrialism.
Id. at 282-88.
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Id. at 283-284.

157 Id. at 283.
159
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Id. at
Id. at
Ibid.
Ibid.
Id. at
Id. at
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Though a rapidly developing technology is a highly significant motivecontrolling factor in the "pluralistic industrialism" model, it is not necessarily
a decisive influence in itself. As the authors state:
The fully developed industrial society is too dynamic and complex
to yield to the dictates of a single imperative; and a theory about
it which yields sole place to any single imperative is too simple
to do more than mislead. 6 5
Industrialism is so complex and subject to such contrary internal
pressures that it never can assume a single uniform unchanging
structure; but it can vary around a general central theme and that
theme is pluralism. 166
Pluralistic industrialism will never reach a final equilibrium. The
contest between the forces of uniformity and for diversity will
give it life and movement and change.... 167
The themes of uniformity and diversity, and manager and managed which mark the world today will characterize it in the future
as well. There will be constant adjustments between these eternally
conflicting themes, but no permanent settlement. They will constitute the ever lasting threads of history: the uniformity that draws
on technology and the diversity that draws on individuality; the
authority that stems from the managers and the rebellions, however
muted, that stem from the managed. These threads of conflict
will continue when class war, and the contest over private versus
public initiative, and the battle between monistic and atomistic
ideologies
have been left far behind in the sedimentary layers of
16
history.
Whether termed theorizing, model-making or conceptualizing, this type
of intellectual skill needs to be encouraged, especially among those in the legal
profession who are dealing with broad-ranging legal-policy problems and among
those students who may expect to spend a portion of their professional careers
in some capacity requiring at least a rudimentary insight into the construction
and function of patterns of societal behavior and institutional practices.
What is suggested is that for some purposes it is useful to consider the
Predictive and Valuative components of the decision process separately although
in much actual judgment-making the two are merged.'6 9 The encouragement
of creative conceptual thought should stimulate greater resourcefulness in the
invention of feasible choices for coping with social problems. To meet the
challenge of the really complex and dangerous problems confronting us today,
to create the means for coping with rapidly breaking events, stress must be
165

Id. at 290.

166

Ibid.

167

Id. at 296.

168

Ibid.

169 See MILLER AND HOWELL, supra note 23. The confusing of fact and value, or otherwise expressed, the refusal to think through consequences on the basis of available information is supposedly illustrated by the thinking of the 1950's to the effect that nuclear war
must annihilate and is therefore immoral, instead of analyzing the situation to determine
if at least a limited defense is feasible. See Marseille, On Thermonuclear War, Bulletin of
the Atomic Scientists, April 1961, p. 157, 159.

NEW TECHNOLOGY AND NATIONAL GOALS
laid on encouraging skills which will produce useful projections into the future

rather than being satisfied with rationalizing the past.
The effective pursuance of this objective not only requires models designed
to project substantive trends but also adequate models of the decision process
itself, sufficiently comprehensive to encompass all significant influencing factors
and sufficiently flexible to respond to conditions of change. Increasing interest
is being directed to the nature of decisional processes.17 ° A model of decisionmaking which, in its simplest form, provides a useful analytical tool at the
legal-policy level would include the following components:
1) The specification of goal-objectives
2) Contextual factors: identification of relevant conditions and trends
3) Designating alternative courses of action
4) Projecting possible outcomes for each alternative
5) Describing specific consequences of each outcome
6) Evaluation of such consequences in ter~ms of the specified valuepreference scale
7) Final choice of course of action to be followed
This general construct may be amplified or modified as desired for specific
decisional contexts.'
In this decisional framework, the previous discussion
of "model" was, of course, related to the fact (condition-trend) and prediction
components.
Frequently, the suggestion for development of predictive skills through
model thinking raises the objection that such predictions are inherently speculative and that reliance thereon involves great risk.'
Of course projections
170 See references, note 133. See, e.g., Feliciano, Book Review, 68 YALE L. J. 1039
(1959), reprinted in MODOUGAL AND ASSOCIATES, STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, 1020
(1960), for an excellent treatment of decisional "models" at the law-policy level; see also
McDougal and Lasswell, The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public
Order, 53 Am. J. INT'L. LAW 1 (1959); BRoss, op. cit. supra note 128 generally; LUCE
AND RAIFFA, GAMES AND DECISIONS (1958); RAPOPORT, FIGHTS, GAMES AND DEBATES
(1960) (considers "models-of conflict" and the "social physics" involving an application of
mathematical model thinking to social and political science. He points out that models
give us more ideas); Snyder, Game Theory and the Analysis of PoliticalBehavior, in SHUBIK,

op. cit. supra note 128, at 70. See also SHUBIK at viii (interest in decision-making growing
in political science field); Hempel, Science and Human Values, in SOCIAL CONTROL IN A
FREE SOCIETY 39 (1960).

WILLIAMS, THE COMPLETE STRATEGYST 217 (1954),

says:

While there are specific applications today, despite the current limitations of the theory, perhaps its greatest contribution so far has been an
intangible one: the general orientation given to people who are faced with
overcomplex problems. Even though these problems are not strictly solvable-certainly not at the moment, and probably not in the indefinite
future-it helps to have a framework in which to work on them. The
concept of a strategy, the distinctions among players, the role of chance
events, the notion of matrix representations of the payoffs, the concepts
of pure and mixed strategies, and so on give valuable orientation to persons
who must think about complicated conflict situations.
For a discussion of decisional organization concepts in practice see Gordon, The Top of

Policy Hill, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September 1960, p. 289, with reference to the
various interpretations of the functions of the National Security Council.
171 See references supra notes 128-135. See also LASSWELL, THE DECISION PROCESS
(1956), for a decisional framework involving seven categories of. functional analysis: Intelligence, Recommendation, Prescription, Invocation, Application, Appraisal, and Termination.
172 See LEwINSOHN, op cit, supra note 132, at Ch. 11 and Envoi. Also, Thomson, The
Foreseeable Future: "Though the extrapolation of trends is an extremely dangerous method
of prediction, as all scientists know, it seems about all we can do here. Even so, one must
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are speculative depending upon the number of operative factors, the reliability
and completeness of the available information, and the adequacy of the model
construct for arranging factors in their most realistic interacting pattern. But
the rationality involved in model thinking does not take the shape of rigid
formulation but as a tool for thought. Our rapidly developing technology and
its impact on the social-political sphere requires inventive prediction so that
necessary decisions can be made with the highest possible degree of confidence.
Obviously, model-thinking requires a prudent use of this analytical tool.
Obsession with the infallibility of prediction of a complex model results in a
surrender of responsible judgment."' 3 Or one may be audacious to the point
of recklessness in employing a model for projections." 4 One may use model
thinking in a distorted fashion as a personal "game" or logical exercise. A
type of superficial logical model building, which largely ignores human emotions or other factors which cannot be easily reduced to objective criteria,
has been appropriately called "Ritualized Rationality" and represents in effect
an excuse for avoiding the difficulty of constructing workable models.'
The late, great mathematician, John von Neumann, in a provocative
article of a few years back entitled: "Can We Survive Technology?" stated
the foregoing problem in these terms:
All experience shows that even smaller technological changes than
those now in the cards profoundly transform political and social
relationships. Experience also shows that these transformations
are not a priori predictable and that most contemporary "first
choose what seems the more fundamental trend to extrapolate." See also Marseille, op. cit.
supra note 169, for a brief prediction-projection of the range of effects of nuclear war:
Kahn concedes not only that in a number of his crucial calculations
he might be off by a factor of three or five, but he also makes allowance
for unknown factors that could upset even the most circumspect forecasts,
for the unpredictability of technological breakthroughs, and for the irrationality of human behavior.
For a critical treatment of the possibilities of a "science of legal prediction" and "forecasting judicial behavior" see FRANx, COURTS ON TRALk, 201-216 (1949).
173 See for example, Robert McNamara, New York Times, February 24, 1961, p. 1, col.
7: "There are great uncertainties as to Soviet future capabilities, as to the ultimate outcome
of struggles now going on in many of the world's trouble spots, and as to the future technological breakthroughs by us or our principal opponent." These uncertainties "greatly complicate" estimates of the future and underscore the need to be "prudent." Consider also
the highly complex "model" formulated by the Bureau of the Budget for purposes of estimating the extent to which spending on national security could be reduced if an acceptable
disarmament agreement were achieved: "As a first attempt to develop further expenditure
estimates in some detail, the report inevitably contains defects, but it represents a start at
providing the kind of information needed to highlight the uncertainties, issues, and alternative objectives which will require decisions as the next decade unfolds." Maurice Stans,
Director of the Bureau. New York Times, February 19, 1961, p. 1, col. 3.

The fact that there may exist a substantial degree of uncertainty in our projection and

estimates of gains and losses to be expected from various policy courses of action does not,
of course, remove the necessity of making particular crucial decisions. See, for example,
Hanson W. Baldwin, To Test or Not To Test, New York Times, June 26, 1961, p. 3, col. 2,
re the critical decision as to whether to resume nuclear testing, "Thus, which side gains by
resumed testing would appear to depend upon a number of speculative factors."
174 See War and Science II -Weakness
of Operational Analysis Said to Center on the
Human Element, Hanson W. Baldwin, New York Times, March 20, 1961, p. C-5, col. 1,
wherein the author discusses operational analysis - "the application of analytic and scientific methods" -to
the solution of military problems.
175 See Michael, Ritualized Rationality and Arms Control, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, February 1961, p. 71, for a highly stimulating treatment of "model-building" approaches.
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guesses" concerning them are wrong. For all these reasons, one
should take neither178present difficulties nor presently proposed reforms too seriously.
Nevertheless, his basic theme advanced the necessity for model-thinking:
"The great Globe itself" is in a rapidly maturing crisis-a crisis
attributable to the fact that the environment in which technological progress must occur has become both undersized and underorganized. To define the crisis with accuracy, and to explore the
possibilities of dealing with it, we must not77 only look at relevant
facts but also engage in some speculation.
F.

Conclusion
What special skills of specific professionals will be most useful in modelthinking depends, of course, upon the segment of public policy decision involved. The legal profession, however, must provide its full share of the
creative, experimental thinking demanded in the legal-policy area. There are
innumerable current problems with important legal components wherein lawtrained participants have both the obligation and opportunity to engage in
useful model-thinking: disarmament and nuclear test ban arrangements; the
shaping of legal codes and governmental machinery suitable to the needs of
nations now emerging from pre-industrial status; the myriad problems arising
from the urbanization movement and the regulation of activities in urban
areas covering interstate regions; the construction of realistic models of mass
media operations, especially television, and the formulation of enlightened
concepts of the "public interest" based thereon; the special problem of projecting the probable uses of "space" in order that suitable guides can be created
for its use and control; and the peaceful application of science and technology
to gain greater cooperation at the international level. Lawyers are participating
to some extent in all of these problem areas, but there is cause for concern as
to whether the degree and quality of legal participation measures up to the
rigid demands made of us today.
One specific area for needed model-thinking at the legal-policy level of
immediate international significance is that of earth satellite development.
These instruments will find valuable use in weather forecasting, as navigational
aids, and for international communications. The prospective benefits from
communications satellites, in particular, seem impressive in terms of easier,
faster, and less expensive international point-to-point communications, but
more importantly, in their potential for international information exchange
which can assist in striking down cultural and political barriers. Some see in
this development the technical means for at last making available the fullest
freedom of information among all peoples. 178 But the possibility of increased
176 Von Neumann, Can We Survive Technology, reprinted in AMERICAN STRATEGY FOR
THE NUCLEAR AGE, 32 (Hahn and Neff ed., 1960). First published in Fortune, June 1955.
177 Id. at 32.
178 Both the cultural potentialities and the policy difficulties are discussed in Smythe,
Communications Satellites, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, February 1961, p. 65-70;
Michael (Brookings study) op. cit. supra note 9 at 1-32, 51-78; see also Shayon, Breakthrough in InternationalTV, Saturday Review, January 14, 1961, p. 35.
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international tension is also present. Will this potentially most beneficial technological device be permitted to develop in an arena of destructive competitive
strife such as we experienced in the early days of radio broadcasting in this
country, or shall we begin working now on institutionalizing this new technical
tool by cooperative and mutually beneficial international arrangements?.. 9
Advancing technology is of such scope and importance, offers so much
for human hope or misery, and is so much a part of our most pressing sociopolitical decisions today, that lawyers must equip themselves to understand the
complexities that arise in such legal policy contexts. To make maximum effec-.
tive use of our vast scientific and technological resources we must employ
realistic models of the extremely complex socio-political-technological interactions within which we move today."' If law is to be a device for effectively
containing and directing social change toward desired goals, major social movements must be described, analyzed and understood.'
Law Schools should take the lead, in particular those in position to pursue programs at an advanced legal-policy level in cooperation with other professional schools, with the profession, and with governmental and non-governmental entities involved in such problems. Further, law schools can perform
a highly useful service by establishing continuing programs directed to selected
legal-policy areas, as for example: the standards, practices and effects of policy
actions in one or more of the independent regulatory agencies, or a continuing
appraisal of the most effective means of employing technological innovation to
serve the peaceful pursuits of mankind. Or attention might be given, for
example, to a project such as the communications satellite program: analyzing
the events and issues posed to date, projecting alternative constructs of development, anticipating the decisions that will have to be made, appraising the
probable consequences of such decisions and commenting upon such effects
in terms of national policy objectives. The project would follow formal governmental action closely, analyzing it, and evaluating its effects. Pursued
through the developmental period of the communications satellite program,
this project would be useful to both governmental and non-governmental representatives having responsibilities therefor.' 2 Such non-partisan analysis, if

179 Ibid.
180 "[T]he theoretical models of the policy scientist must-be made to fit the real world
far more closely than they do at present." Dahl, op. cit. supra note 128, at 67.
181 See Friedmann, op. cit. supra note 23, at 3-23, 26; Stone, op. cit. supra note 13, at
142-144. Dror, Law and Social Change, 33 TuLANE L. REv. 787, 795 (1959): "The
growing use of law as a device of organized social action directed toward achieving social
change seems to be one of the characteristics of modem society which is in need of intensive
study."
182 Possibly this program creates more difficulties for the United States than for other
nations which have a higher degree of centralized control over industrial production. Among
the problems previously decided, now posed, or which will soon demand an answer are:
1) What priorities are to be placed on the various uses of communications satellites? 2) By
what procedures and by what criteria will the systems to be developed be selected from the
multiple systems proposed? 3) With respect to non-military uses, what role will private
industry have in the program? 4) Will competition be encouraged? 5) What arrangements
will be made between government and private companies and foreign nations concerning
launching such satellites, radio frequency allocation, and orbit traffic control? 6) If some
degree of international supervision is indicated, what should be the form, procedures, and
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thoroughly and intelligently done, would keep legal education abreast of significant legal-policy problems, would constitute a substantial public service,
and hopefully, would train professional personnel better equipped to handle
such problems in future years.

scope of authority of such activity?

7) Will allocation of time between various sorts of

programming be required? 8) Will effective use of satellites require international standardization of equipment? 9) What is the effect of control over the satellites going to be
in terms of the "free speech and press" principle?
See Michael (Brookings Study) op. cit. supra note 9, at 640, 25-28, 51-77; Smythe,
Communications Satellites, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. February 1961, p. 65-70.

